Chapter 3: Notification and response
3.1 Notification
3.1.1 In most incidents (malevolent or not), it is likely that the first indications of a radiological event will come from a local emergency response organization – police, fire, and emergency medical services. In such cases, notifications will likely proceed according to local plans/procedures.
3.1.2 Communities shall notify the PEOC where an emergency is declared or, whenever it activates its emergency response plan for such an incident (Section 2.12).
3.1.3 Pursuant to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and its associated regulations, any person/organization licensed by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to hold, use or transport radioactive material is responsible for notifying the CNSC in the event of an occurrence resulting in the release or loss of control of radioactive materials.
3.1.4 The CNSC will notify the province (through the PEOC) of any report it receives from a licensee of an occurrence which has resulted, or has the potential to result in the receipt, by any member of the public, of a dose of ionizing radiation in excess of prescribed regulatory limits.
3.1.5 Upon receipt of a notification, from any source, of an occurrence of a radiological event whose effects have not been contained and/or which has the potential to affect public health and safety, the PEOC shall notify the following entities:
- The appropriate provincial ministries (Paragraph 2.8.2(b));
- The affected community(ies);
- Federal departments and organizations with responsibilities under this plan, including:
- Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission;
- Health Canada; and
- Public Safety Canada.
The province shall transmit, in its notification to the above agencies, the response phase being adopted as per Section 3.2 below.
3.1.6 Where the incident is as a result of a malevolent act, the Provincial Counter Terrorism Plan (PCTP) shall be activated to deal with the law enforcement aspect of protecting public safety. The purpose of the Other Radiological Emergencies Response Plan is to coordinate the consequence management aspect of the radiological incident. This plan can coexist with the PCTP and coordination of the emergency response operations under the two plans shall be undertaken through, and facilitated by, the Incident Management System structure.
3.1.7 Notification at the Community level:
- Where a community has persons or organizations licensed by the CNSC within its area, it should ensure that such licensees are aware of the appropriate community contact point to which the initial notification should be made.
- Community Emergency Response Plans should detail the appropriate notifications as well as the response actions within the organization, in the event of a radiological emergency. This should include notification to the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC).
- If the community declares an emergency to deal with the radiological incident, it shall, as required under the Emergency Management & Civil Protection Act, notify the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services (through the PEOC).
- Upon receipt of a notification from the province of a radiological incident resulting in the activation of this Plan, the community shall activate its emergency response plan and organization (pursuant to section 4 of the EMCPA).
3.2 Response phases
3.2.1 The response to a radiological emergency, for the purposes of this plan, is divided into three phases:
- Initial Response Phase;
- Intermediate Response Phase; and
- Recovery Phase.
3.3 Initial response phase
3.3.1 The Initial Phase is the period at the beginning of the incident when immediate decisions for effective use of protective actions are required and actual field measurement data is generally not available.
3.3.2 The response during this phase includes initial emergency response actions undertaken by first response organizations (Police, Fire, Emergency Medical Services) to protect public health and welfare in the short term.
3.3.3 Priority should be given to lifesaving and first-aid actions.
3.3.4 Zoning the event scene into Access Control Zones (Hot, Warm and Cold) Table 3.1 will help reduce radiation exposures, aid in controlling the spread of radioactive contamination and minimize interference with emergency operations. Protective actions are taken very quickly and can be modified later as more information becomes available.
3.3.5 The immediate actions required include:
- Determining and providing dose limit guidance for first responders/ emergency workers (Annex C and CNSC Information Sheet INFO-0754-4 "Incident Control and Decontamination for First Responders" (PDF 1.4 MB).
- Delineation of Access Control Zones:
- Criteria for the delineation of access control zones (i.e. Hot, Warm and Cold Zones) are prescribed in the CNSC Information Sheet INFO-0754-4 "Incident Control and Decontamination for First Responders" (PDF 1.4 MB).
- Immediate care of injured:
- In most circumstances, life saving actions and actions to secure the area of a radiological terrorist event from further terrorist activities should take precedence over radiological considerations following a terrorist event. A possible exception pertains to the need to secure the area near ground zero soon after detonation of the radiological device.
- All affected individuals must be attended to by medical personnel and stabilized for traumatic injuries before the consideration of radiation injury can be made.
- Radiation Triage: Once the affected individuals have been medically stabilized, radiation triage assessment must be undertaken.
- Protective Actions:
- First responders will have to decide whether sheltering or evacuation is most appropriate. Generally, except within a potential explosive blast zone from which people are likely to be evacuated, sheltering will normally be the preferred protective measure until such time that actual dose measurements can be made and their implications determined.
- Evacuations should be directed if it is more protective than sheltering.
- Decontamination:
- The CNSC recommends that a decontamination area be set up at least 5 meters behind a point where the reading is twice background. Typical background levels are approximately 0.25 μSv/h for a gamma dose rate meter.
- Monitoring for contamination and applying decontamination techniques should be performed prior to releasing people.
- Decontamination must be undertaken (i.e. clothes removed and bagged and skin cleared) at levels of twice background or higher, when measured by sweeping with a pancake meter. Typical background is 50 cpm for a 15 cm² pancake contamination meter.
3.4 Intermediate response phase
3.4.1 The Intermediate Phase (or environmental radiation monitoring phase) Table 3.1 may occur simultaneously with, or shortly after the initial phase with activation of the provincial response organization. Provincial decision-making, however, will be based on environmental monitoring which may take longer to activate.
3.4.2 Environmental monitoring activities will be carried out to identify and quantify the contents of the radiological contaminants.
3.4.3 Appropriately trained nuclear energy workers (as defined by the Nuclear Safety and Control Act) will carry out these activities.
3.4.4 Protective action measures are likely to be needed based on results of ground monitoring.
3.4.5 Measurements of exposure and ground depositions will enable protective action decisions to be modified.
3.4.6 Initial Provincial Response: The initial provincial response in the event of a radiological emergency is contingent on the characteristics of the incident:
- If the radiological source remains intact or confined, with no impact on public safety, the responsibility remains that of the licensee under the regulatory control of the CNSC. The province will continue normal Routine Monitoring.
- If the radiological source has the potential to affect offsite public health and safety, provincial assistance will be provided. The response level adopted by the province will be determined by the level of assistance required as well as the level of staffing undertaken by the PEOC.
- Notwithstanding the above, where any incident is as a result of a malevolent act (terrorism) the PEOC shall adopt the Activation response.
- The following are the key operations undertaken at the provincial level for response to a radiological incident.
3.4.7 Overview of Environmental Radiation Monitoring Operations:
- Radiation monitoring will be directed for both the area where the radiological incident occurred and, in the event of a widely dispersed event, for selected sites around the province as well, in order to gather radiological information about the contamination, e.g. plume and deposition, air and ground concentrations, exposure rates, etc.
- Hybrid teams comprising members from federal, Ontario's nuclear facilities and private sector organizations may be assembled to jointly carry out the radiation monitoring activities. The PEOC shall have the overall responsibility of organizing and coordinating the radiation monitoring resources and utilization of findings according to the Environmental Radiation Monitoring procedures.
- Initially, fixed monitoring resources shall be surveyed and aerial field-monitoring teams will be deployed to:
- Identify the type of radioactive contaminants;
- Determine how far they have spread and in what direction; and
- Determine if additional resources are needed.
The information can then be used to direct ground monitoring resources to carry out more detailed field surveys in areas of concern in order to develop a more refined contamination picture.
- If emergency responders are first at the scene, they would have already established access control zones (Paragraph 3.3.5 (b)). Based on the new, radiological monitoring information, the PEOC may revise/adjust the initial zone boundaries, creating response zones (Paragraph 3.4.8) within which appropriate protective measures can be ordered/adjusted.
- The radiological picture of the contaminated area will continue to change over time due to radioactive decay, natural processes of weathering, dispersion, dilution, etc. as well as human activities and intervention. It will therefore be necessary to continue a monitoring program to keep track of the changing radiological situation. As more accurate data accumulates, the boundaries of the zones and therefore the requirement for, and extent of, protective measures will be appropriately adjusted.
3.4.8 Delineation of Zones
- Field monitoring carried out under the direction of the Scientific Section shall result in the delineation of zones, as outlined below and shown in Figure 3.2.
- Protective Measures will be directed, based on the delineation of these zones.
- Restricted Zone - The area within which exposure control measures are likely to be needed, based on the results of field monitoring. These measures would be applied within this Restricted Zone as per the Protective Action Levels (Annex C).
- Buffer Zone - This zone provides a buffer area beyond the Restricted Zone, where limited measures of radioactivity are detected. The buffer zone is initially delineated based on the results of preliminary field monitoring. Ingestion control measures may be applied within this zone based on guidance provided by the Protective Action Levels (Annex C), and in accordance with direction provided by Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency
3.4.9 Protective Actions
- Protective actions include precautionary measures and protective measures.
- In principle, protective actions should be applied so as to prevent any increased exposure of people to radiation due to the emergency. In practice, this may not always be justified since protective actions also entail some risk and/or cost. It is therefore necessary to optimize the application of protective actions so as to minimize the total risk or detriment involved.
- A range of precautionary and protective measures are available to deal with radiological emergencies. They are complementary to each other, and should be applied in combination as appropriate to the situation, and taking into account their respective efficacies and limitations.
- The PEOC will decide on appropriate precautionary and protective measures based on the Scientific Section's technical assessments, and on operational and public policy considerations. Where a protective measure is warranted, the PEOC shall consider the advisability of issuing Operational Directives (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advising that such orders have been made).
- In the first instance, before reliable radiological information is available, protective action decisions will have been taken by emergency responders. Once the environmental monitoring teams are activated and data is received and analyzed, these protective measures can be adjusted, based on operational, technical and public policy considerations.
- The PEOC shall consider the advisability of issuing operational directives for any precautionary and protective measures in the Restricted and Buffer Zones and shall issue the necessary directions for their implementation.
- Guidance for levels at which protective actions are undertaken are provided in Annex C are detailed in Table 3.4.
- The measures (set out in Table 1.1 of this plan and further defined in the glossary in Annex E).
3.4.10 Radiation Health Response Plan
- The MOHLTC has developed a Radiation Health Response Plan (RHRP) to deal with potentially exposed and/or contaminated persons following a nuclear or radiological event.
- The RHRP provides a framework for the overall health response to a radiological event and an overview of general principles for the public health response.
- This Radiation Health Response Plan will be activated as soon as the Other Radiological Emergencies Response Plan has been activated for a radiological emergency. The RHRP will be implemented through the MOHLTC Emergency Operations Centre.
- The health response actions, as detailed in the RHRP, that may be required for both the public and emergency workers (including medical personnel) include:
- Preventing the contamination of medical workers and the medical facilities;
- Monitoring for external contamination;
- Decontamination;
- Internal contamination monitoring;
- Dose estimations;
- Screen for acute radiation exposure;
- Maintaining a database for medical follow-up
- Reduction of internal contamination, where possible;
- Administration of KI Pills (Potassium Iodine);
- Provide treatment for acute radiation exposure;
- Counselling;
- Public communication; and
- Public health information program.
3.4.11 Deployment of provincial staff
- Per Paragraphs 2.8.2 (a) and 2.15.3, provincial staff may be deployed, if considered appropriate, to the community(ies) affected by the incident as well as to other jurisdictions involved in the operational response to the incident, e.g. federal government, state or provincial EOCs.
- The role of deployed staff will be to:
- Maintain close liaison with the jurisdiction(s) dealing with the emergency;
- Provide direction/guidance to the community(ies) on actions they may need to take;
- Obtain and transmit to the PEOC all relevant information on the situation; and
- Provide information to those jurisdictions on the actions taken by the province.
3.4.12 Emergency Information
- The PEOC will arrange for emergency information to be regularly issued to the media and the public and ensure coordination of releases of information with the affected municipalities and the federal government.
- If it is deemed appropriate, provincial emergency information staff may be deployed to the local area's emergency information centre.
3.4.13 Ongoing assessment of the situation
- The PEOC will carry out an ongoing assessment of the situation based on information received from the community emergency response organization(s)/CNSC/licensee (as applicable), as well as from the results of radiation monitoring carried out within Ontario.
- The main aims of this ongoing assessment are:
- To develop, modify as necessary, and implement a radiation monitoring plan;
- To decide on the imposition/lifting of protective measures;
- To modify the protective measures implemented based on the results of the ongoing field monitoring; and
- To adjust the response level and/or staffing level, as required.
3.4.14 Emergency worker safety
- It is the responsibility of the Minister of Labour to oversee the system of Emergency Worker Safety to ensure that employers meet their obligations concerning health and safety of workers during a radiological emergency.
- Emergency Worker Organizations should ensure the provision of equipment and training to their personnel, as appropriate, to enable them to respond to radiological emergencies. The equipment should include personal dosimeters, and other personal protective equipment as required, for the protection of emergency workers.
- In addition, emergency worker organizations should ensure the provision of radiation detection and assessment equipment in vehicles, or should have access to such equipment through mutual aid agreements, as appropriate.
- Emergency Workers includes police, firefighters, emergency medical services, personnel from the Canadian Forces, and other individuals that may be providing support to the response.
- Emergency Worker organizations should ensure that their staff adheres to the guidance set out by the CNSC for limiting their effective doses when working in the area.
- Guidance for limiting the effective dose for first responders and emergency workers is provided in Table 3.3.
3.4.15 Compensation: Where applicable, compensation for losses will be made according to the terms and conditions of the Nuclear Liability Act.
3.5 Recovery Phase
3.5.1 The Recovery Phase begins with recovery and cleanup actions designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable levels and ends when all the recovery actions have been completed.
3.5.2 Transition from Response Phase to Recovery Phase:
- At a suitable stage the PEOC will consult with the major organizations involved in the emergency response regarding their transition to the Recovery Phase, and what lead time they would need to make a smooth transition.
- Based on these consultations, the PEOC will set a time for the ending of the Response Phase (and the commencement of Recovery Phase) and inform all concerned in advance.
- At the transition point, the Response Phase will end, the Recovery Phase will commence, and the required organizational and other changes will be made by all those affected as prescribed in recovery plans and procedures, and as directed by the PEOC.
- Guidance on the issues to be dealt with during the Recovery Phase is provided in Annex E.
3.6 Termination of offsite response
3.6.1 Response to a nuclear or radiological emergency will be terminated in one of the following ways:
- A decision by the Chief, Emergency Management Ontario or designate, that the event that caused the initial notification shall not be dealt with under this Plan;
- A formal termination of the provincial response by the Chief, Emergency Management Ontario, or designate;
- A formal termination of the offsite response by the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre;
- Following an emergency declaration, termination of the emergency pursuant to Section 7.0.7 of the EMCPA.
Table 3.1: Initial and Intermediate Response Phases
Initial Response Phase
Response Organizations
- Police
- Fire
- Emergency Medical Services
Delineation of Access Control Zones
- Hot
- Warm
- Cold
Criteria for the delineation of access control zones: prescribed in the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Information Sheet INGO-0754-4 'Incident Control and Decontamination for First Responders'.
Intermediate Response Phase
Response Organizations
- Ministries
- Federal Organizations
- Communities
Delineation of Zones
- Restricted
- Buffer
Definition of delineation of zones: prescribed in the Nuclear/Radiological Glossary Annex E.
Figure 3.2: Radiation Contamination Zones

Table 3.3: Emergency dose limits for emergency workers / nuclear energy workers
Workers | Non-emergency | Emergency |
---|---|---|
Member of the Public (including Emergency Workers) |
1 mSv / year (0.1 rem / year) |
500 mSv[**] (50 rem) |
Nuclear Energy Worker |
|
500 mSv[**] (50 rem) |
Regulated effective doses*
* Nuclear Safety & Control Act, Radiation Protection Regulations, CNSC, May 2000.
** Maximum Dose allowed; Note: there is no limit for a person who acts voluntarily to save or protect human life (such response actions should only be taken with an understanding of the potential acute effects of radiation to the exposed responder and based on the determination that the benefits of the action clearly exceed the associated risks).
Table 3.4: Protective Action Considerations
Measure | Considerations |
---|---|
Restricting access to potentially affected areas |
|
Measure | Considerations |
---|---|
Entry Control |
|
Sheltering |
|
Evacuation |
|
Thyroid Blocking/KI (Potassium Iodine) |
|
Use of Protective Equipment |
|
Decontamination and Dose Reduction |
|
Measure | Considerations |
---|---|
Food Restrictions |
|