Explanatory note

The Ontario Government is releasing past SIU Director Reports (submitted to the Attorney General prior to May 2017) that include fatalities involving a firearm, physical altercation, and/or use of conducted energy weapon, or other extensive police interaction that did not result in a criminal charge.

Justice Michael H. Tulloch made recommendations about the release of past SIU Director Reports in the Report of the Independent Police Oversight Review, released on April 6, 2017.

Justice Tulloch explained that since past reports were not originally drafted for public release they may have to be edited substantially to protect sensitive information. He took into account that confidentiality assurances were given to various witnesses during the course of SIU investigations, and recommended that some information be redacted in the interests of privacy, safety, and security.

As recommended by Justice Tulloch, this explanatory note is being provided to assist the reader’s understanding of why certain information is redacted in these reports. Notes have also been inserted throughout the reports to help describe the nature of the information that was redacted and why it was redacted.

Law enforcement and personal privacy information considerations

Consistent with Justice Tulloch’s recommendations and guided by section 14 of the Freedom of Information and Protection to Privacy Act (FIPPA) (relating to law enforcement information), portions of these reports have been removed to protect:

  • confidential investigative techniques and procedures used by the SIU
  • information whose release could reasonably be expected to interfere with a law enforcement matter or an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding
  • witness statements and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation, provided to the SIU in confidence

Consistent with Justice Tulloch’s recommendations and guided by section 21 of FIPPA (relating to personal privacy information), personal information, including sensitive personal information, has also been redacted, except that which is necessary to explain the rationale for the Director’s decision. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:

  • subject officer name(s)
  • witness officer name(s)
  • civilian witness name(s)
  • location information
  • other identifiers which are likely to reveal personal information about individuals involved in the investigation, including in relation to children
  • witness statements and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation, provided to the SIU in confidence

Personal health information

Information related to the personal health of individuals that is unrelated to the Director’s decision (taking into consideration the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004) has been redacted.

Other proceedings, processes, and investigations

Information may have also been excluded from these reports because its release could undermine the integrity of other proceedings involving the same incident, such as criminal proceedings, coroner’s inquests, other public proceedings and/or other law enforcement investigations.

Director’s report

Notification of the SIU

On December 1, 2007 at 0353 hrs, Notifying Officer of the Halton Regional Police Service (HRPS) notified the SIU of the firearm death of Mr. Steve Remian. Notifying Officer reported that at 0134 hrs on December 1, 2007, Civilian Witness #1 called 911 after he/she encountered a man (later identified as Mr. Remian) at a Tim Horton’s on Trafalgar Road north of Lakeshore Boulevard in Oakville. Mr. Remian was armed with a long gun and was speaking to Civilian Witness #1 about suicide or homicide. The HRPS officers responded and spoke with Civilian Witness #1. The officers obtained a Sensitive Personal Information license plate number for Mr. Remian’s vehicle and confirmed his full name. The HRPS checked several addresses for Mr. Remian without success. Officers located Mr. Remian’s vehicle and they followed it into a dead end located off Weaver Avenue in Oakville.

At 0232 hrs, officers reported that they had Mr. Remian’s vehicle stopped. Mr. Remian exited his vehicle while holding a gun under his chin. At 0233 hrs, Emergency Medical Service (EMS) was requested because three tactical officers and one uniformed officer had fired multiple shots. Mr. Remian was pronounced deceased at the scene.

The investigation

On December 1, 2007, at 0414 hrs, six investigators and three forensic investigators (FI) were dispatched to the scene. At 0520 hrs, investigators arrived on scene and began their investigation.

At 0553 hrs, Notifying Officer briefed the investigators. As a result of the information received, Subject Officer #1, Subject Officer #2 and Subject Officer #3 were designated as subject officers. On December 14, 2007, Subject Officer #2 and Subject Officer #1 waived the protections afforded them by virtue of the Police Services Act, were interviewed by the SIU, and provided

copies of their duty notes. Subject Officer #3 exercised his/her rights and chose not to provide a statement, however he/she provided a copy of his/her duty notes.

The following police officers were designated as the witness officers and interviewed on the dates indicated:

  • Witness Officer #1 (December 5, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #2 (December 5, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #3 (December 6, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #4 (December 6, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #5 (December 6, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #6 (December 6, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #7 (December 7, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #8 (December 7, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #9 (December 7, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #10 (December 7, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #11 (December 7, 2007)
  • Witness Officer #12 (December 7, 2007), and
  • Witness Officer #13 (December 10, 2007)

The following civilian witnesses were interviewed on the dates indicated:

  • Civilian Witness #1 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #2 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #3 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #4 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #5 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #6 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #7 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #8 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #9 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #10 (December 1, 2007, December 7, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #11 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #12 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #13 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #14 (December 1, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #15 (December 3, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #16 (December 5, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #17 (December 6, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #18 (December 6, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #19 (December 6, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #20 (December 6, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #21 (December 14, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #22 (December 14, 2007)
  • Civilian Witness #23 (December 18, 2007), and
  • Civilian Witness #24 (December 18, 2007)

Upon request, the SIU obtained and reviewed the following documents and materials from the HRPS:

  • Communication Tape, and
  • Computer Aided Dispatch Report (CAD)

Witness statements and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation provided to the SIU in confidence (Law Enforcement and Privacy Considerations)

Director’s decision under s. 113(7) of the Police Services Act

In my view, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that any of the officers involved in this tragic incident committed any criminal offence. The evidence gathered in the course of this exhaustive investigation paints a clear picture of a troubled man who was struggling with many demons enlisting the police to end his life when it appears at the critical time, he could not muster the strength to do so himself.

This man had been facing numerous challenges in his life and had just started to re-settle in Oakville. Confidential Witness Statement and unfortunately he turned to drink to cope. This appears to have caused or contributed to a downward spiral into depression and self-destructive thought.

Through the evidence gathered in the course of this investigation we learned that not only had this man harboured self-destructive thoughts in the past but that he had contemplated at least one way to end his life and that was by putting himself in a situation where police officers would be left with no choice but to kill him.

After being ejected from a local drinking establishment in the early morning hours of December 1, 2007, this man was seen in the parking lot of a Tim Horton’s coffee shop. He was approached by two patrons of the coffee shop as he was obviously distraught and they sought to offer assistance. This man, during the course of their conversation, showed them a long gun that he had in his trunk and spoke in such a way to cause the two patrons to fear that he was either going to harm himself or someone else, or both. One of those patrons called 911 to report what he had seen and heard.

Police responded immediately and set about recording the information from these two patrons and attempting to identify and then locate the man with the gun (who had left just after speaking with the two men in the Tim Horton’s parking lot).

A number of officers assisted in this effort and just before 0218 they located this man driving in the area of Wedgewood Park (an old stomping ground of his youth). The man pulled into the park and drove along a path into a stand of trees and his vehicle became stuck. The police surrounded his car and started to attempt to negotiate his safe surrender at approximately 0220. At 0221 one of the officers flattened two or his car’s tires by shooting them to stop his efforts of moving his car.

Many local residents heard and/or saw parts of the standoff. Most of them had their attention drawn to the incident by either the sound of motor vehicles or by those initial four shots that were fired at the tires. The residents clearly support the version of events conveyed by the officers. That version is also confirmed by the documentary and recorded evidence.

What ensued after the tires were flattened, on the basis of virtually all the evidence, was a concerted negotiation effort. It was the view of those civilians with whom this Unit was able to make contact that the officer conducting these negotiations was calm, authoritative, empathetic and patient. I agree with that characterization.

It was equally obvious to everyone witnessing or involved in this incident that this man was upset, in grave emotional turmoil, under a great deal of stress and likely depressed. Throughout their dealings with this man, the officers were desperately trying to get him to disarm and give himself up. He would not.

During the attempted negotiations, the man got out of his car armed with his rifle (this Unit determined that the rifle was loaded and he had more than 400 rounds of ammunition available to himself either in the gun, in his pockets or in the car). Also in the car we located a note that can only be characterized as a suicide note.

Throughout the continued negotiations this man held the muzzle of the rifle under his chin and on more than one occasion it appeared to those involved that he was trying to summon up the will to end his own life. He could not and at one point said, “I can’t even be a loser right.” He also asked the officers to end this for him.

The negotiations continued on until around 0235 when one of the officers saw an opportunity to try to bring the standoff to a peaceful end by firing his Taser. Unfortunately, there was a very narrow target of exposed skin for the probes to attach and it is clear that no good connection was made to the man’s body and the Taser was ineffective.

The man ripped the probes out of his clothing and after a moment levelled his gun at the officers and was shot and killed. The officers rushed over to him to see if they could possibly administer first aid and they also summoned an ambulance that was waiting nearby. It was obvious though that there was no saving this man due to the nature of his injuries. The evidence we uncovered in this investigation discloses that the officers involved in this incident were visibly and profoundly shaken by the magnitude of the event and its fatal outcome.

It appears that eight of the 14 shots fired at this man struck him. There were a total of 17 shots fired by officers using .223 rifles and one shot fired by an officer with a pistol. Five of the shots were fatal or potentially fatal. The fatal shots were fired at 0237.

These officers were dealing with a distraught, inconsolable and depressed man who that morning was preoccupied with self-destructive thoughts. The officers obviously had to isolate this man from other civilians given the fact that he was armed with a firearm. They could not simply retreat. That being said they did not rush the car. Instead, they chose what appears to have been their only reasonable option and that was an attempt to convince him to disarm and surrender. As I have said, the officer who took on that function did so quite professionally. Furthermore, the officers carefully considered their use of force options and attempted to end this incident first by use of negotiation and tactical communication and then by less-lethal force through the Taser. Even then the Taser was not deployed until it appeared to the officer that there was a reasonable prospect that it would be effective and also not until the man’s finger appeared to be off the trigger of the rifle he was holding (thus avoiding an unintentional discharge of the long gun).

It is my view on the basis of the evidence in this case that the officers were faced with a very real threat of lethal force and were legally justified in responding to that threat with lethal force. This was a tragedy that was not of their making.

There is one matter that I will raise with the Chief of the HRPS that is disclosed on the evidence. It appears that Witness Officer #2 debriefed all the involved officers together immediately after the incident and then told them that they should not speak with each other further about this incident. Of course the SIU’s mandate was obviously effective at that time and there should have been a segregation of the officers not a de-briefing.

Original signed by

Date: March 14, 2008

James L. Cornish

Director

Special Investigations Unit