A.1 Guiding principles

The following principles underlie the PNERP and guide all offsite nuclear emergency management in the province:

  1. The province, through its ministries, agencies, boards and commissions, has the primary responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of all inhabitants of the province, and the protection of property and the environment.
  2. The province shall support and coordinate the response to the offsite consequences of a nuclear emergency and may, where warranted and appropriate, issue operational directives and, in the event of a declared provincial emergency, emergency orders, in accordance with the EMCPA.
  3. In the event of a radiological emergency, other than one occurring at a reactor facility, the province’s role may vary from providing support to coordinating the response.
  4. Even though reactor facilities are designed and operated according to stringent safety standards, emergency preparedness and response must operate on the basis that mechanical failure, human error, extreme natural events, or hostile action can lead to nuclear emergencies.
  5. This PNERP details the response for managing the consequences resulting from a reactor facility accident and, as such, does not contemplate its root cause. However, all plans under the PNERP should be able to deal effectively with a broad range of possible emergencies, including severe reactor facility accidents.
  6. The protection of the public’s health, safety, welfare, property and the protection of the environment must be balanced with other important considerations to ensure that the response actions result in more benefit than harm.
  7. Protective measures shall be implemented to prevent acute (deterministic) effects and should be implemented to prevent or reduce chronic (stochastic) effects on the public.
  8. Flexibility must be built into all plans and procedures to allow for the optimization of protective and operational measures in response to the changing nature of the emergency and its consequences for public health and safety.
  9. Protective actions should be applied to keep the dose to the public ALARA, accounting for the social and economic risks and costs of such avoidance.
  10. As far as is practicable, preparedness activities should be undertaken in advance to enable a rapid, effective, and efficient response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.
  11. Preparedness activities should include a program of public awareness and education for people who might be affected, to inform them of emergency plans, how they should prepare for an emergency and what they should expect to do in an emergency.
  12. Public awareness and education preparedness activities should further ensure ongoing and meaningful consultation with vulnerable populations in consideration of their unique needs.
  13. As far as is practicable, operational measures (especially alerting and notification systems) and protective measures should be implemented to avoid significant radiation exposure.
  14. A policy of truth and transparency should be followed in providing information to the public and media prior to, during and after a nuclear or radiological emergency.

A.2 Principles of justification and optimization

The principle of justification ensures that, in an emergency, protective action decisions result in greater benefit than harm.

Optimization of the protective actions ensures that doses are kept ALARA, while minimizing, as far as possible, health, safety, psychosocial, economic and environmental impacts.

In the planning and preparedness stage, these principles were applied when detailing the following:

  1. Appropriate precautionary, protective and ingestion control measures and considerations for their implementation (Annex L )
  2. GC and OILs at which to apply protective and ingestion control measures (Annex Q)
  3. Initial, pre-determined, protective measures based on the initial notification categories transmitted by the reactor facility (Section 8.5).

The CEM is responsible for ensuring the continuing practice of justification and optimization of protective actions, using the tools developed in the preparedness phase and, in consultation with the designated municipalities and appropriate members of the emergency response organization.

As the emergency progresses through the Urgent and Early Response Phases and ultimately to the Recovery Phase, the time available for recovery planning decreases and with it, the opportunity for public input into the protective measures strategy and the justification and optimization thereof. Recovery Phase planning should be initiated during preparedness and should include a system, as detailed in the PNROP, to prioritize and facilitate the involvement of the affected public and other relevant partner organizations in developing the initial Recovery Phase protection strategy and updating the strategy based on the prevailing conditions. Planning during preparedness will support justified and optimized protective action decision-making during recovery.

A.3 Justification and optimization of protective action strategies

The objective of protective action decision-making is to reduce radiation doses while minimizing, as far as possible, societal, economic, and environmental disruptions.

When applied to protective action decision-making, the principle of justification requires that decisions will result in greater benefit than harm for the affected population.

Upon receipt of an initial notification from the reactor facility of an ongoing or imminent emission, protective measures should be directed by the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) subject to operational situation considerations, based on a conservative estimate of the situation.

Urgent response actions (which may include sheltering-in-place, evacuation, and ITB) are pre-defined because time or data may not be available to carry out a comprehensive assessment of imminent risk and are detailed in the applicable implementing plan.

The basis for the justification process rests in calculating projected doses or measuring actual dose rates against GC or OILs respectively. This analysis is detailed in the Scientific Section procedures.

A technical assessment of actual environmental radiation monitoring (surveillance and sampling) results applied against OILs (Annex Q.2 ) should inform the decision-making process to determine the need for both ingestion control and exposure control measures.

Optimization principles must then be applied to the justified protective action decision to ensure that it is implemented in such a way as to minimize psychosocial, economic, and other disruptions. This application is detailed in the Planning Section procedures.

Justification and optimization reassessment of the protective action strategy should be undertaken regularly as the emergency progresses and as more information becomes available.

Where the effectiveness or safety of a protective action might be impacted by another emergency happening at the same time, the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall consult with the ministry responsible for that type of emergency to ensure the proposed actions are justified.

Authorities having jurisdiction should develop decision-making guidance and tools for the justification and optimization of protective action strategies during all phases of the emergency.