L.1 Precautionary measures

Precautionary measures should be implemented during the Urgent Response Phase either in advance of, or in combination with, exposure control protective measures to facilitate their implementation. Unlike protective measures, precautionary measures are not associated with a numerical intervention level.

The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) will direct precautionary measures as appropriate, and where time permits, in consultation with applicable responsible ministries and the affected designated municipalities.

Precautionary measures shall be directed to the public via EBs (Section 8.7.2.2), or other public communications channels (as the situation dictates), and issued by the PEOC Commander. Municipalities will be informed via PNOORF update. The provincial ERO shall be informed in advance via IMS Form 201 or 209, as time permits.
Precautionary measures include (but are not limited to):

  1. closing of beaches, recreation areas, etc.
  2. closing of workplaces and schools
  3. suspension of non-critical patient admissions in hospitals
  4. entry control.

L.2 Protective measures

L.2.1 Evacuation

An evacuation is:

  1. A directed exposure control measure for the controlled displacement of the population from an area, which has been or might become contaminated by radioactive substances to avoid exposure
  2. Normally less than a period of two weeks. If an evacuation is expected to last longer than two weeks, temporary relocation should be considered (see Annex L.2.5)
  3. Normally undertaken during the Urgent or Early Response Phase to avoid or reduce short-term exposure to the plume or deposited radiation.

L.2.1.1 Responsibility for evacuation

Responsibility for directing evacuation rests with the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) or the LGIC, following the decision-making authorities outlined in Section 7.5 .

In circumstances where the directive is not being issued as a protective measure following an initial notification from the reactor facility, the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall consult with the following, as time permits, to determine the applicability of this measure:

  1. Scientific Section Chief regarding emission timing, intervention levels, and the appropriateness of evacuation as a protective measure
  2. affected designated municipalities
  3. CMOH to determine the need to direct ITB as a supplemental protective measure.

The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall ensure that all protective measures are issued to the public via emergency bulletin (Section 8.7.2.2 ) and that municipalities (notified through the PNOORF) are affecting the protective measures to the best of their abilities. Upon receipt of a PNOORF, or the issuance of an EB, the municipalities support the implementation of the protective action, where and when they can (e.g., UTCC and local police identify best evacuation options and direct traffic for an efficient evacuation).

L.2.1.2 Considerations for evacuation

Evacuation should be directed in areas where the projected or actual dose is expected to equal or exceed the evacuation GC (pre-release) or OILs (post-release) (Annex L.2.5 ).

Evacuation is most effective at limiting exposures when completed prior to the radioactive release.

When evacuation is implemented during a radioactive release, radiation exposure could be increased. Therefore, if the release duration is known to be short, sheltering-in-place may be directed, followed by evacuation after the release. However, if the release is known to be prolonged, evacuation in the plume should be assessed in comparison to sheltering-in-place in order to determine the most effective protective measure to minimize the effective dose to the impacted population.

Evacuation can provide protection against unnecessary exposure to radiological contamination in the environment after a release, when sheltering-in-place is not a viable option.

Evacuation of the affected population should be considered for those areas where sheltering-in-place is expected to be required for more than 48 hours.

In the offsite area immediately adjacent to the source of radiation, evacuation may be the best protective action unless:

  1. Persons are unable to safely evacuate (e.g., persons with health conditions that would make evacuation more dangerous than sheltering-in-place); or
  2. Conditions exist which make the evacuation hazardous (e.g., inclement weather, road or transportation issues, consequences resulting from another hazard); in such cases, sheltering-in-place may be more appropriate followed by evacuation once the release has ceased and it is possible to safely evacuate.

L.2.2 Sheltering-in-place

L.2.2.1 General

Sheltering-in-place is normally directed in the Urgent Response Phase of a nuclear emergency response. A directed sheltering-in-place order is a short-term exposure control measure for taking immediate refuge in an enclosed structure, with windows and doors closed and ventilation systems shut down, for protection from an airborne plume, deposited radioactive material, or both.

Sheltering-In-Place may be appropriate as an interim measure in areas where:

  1. A release is expected to occur before evacuations can be safely completed.
  2. The release is expected to be of short duration, not exceeding 48 hrs.
  3. Sheltering-In-Place may be a preferable alternative to evacuation where circumstances prevent a safe and efficient evacuation or for maintenance of essential services:
    1. Severe weather conditions
    2. Environmental or other hazards
    3. Transportation infrastructure issues
    4. For vulnerable populations (e.g., hospitals, long-term care homes, etc.) for whom evacuation may pose greater risks than that of the hazard itself; or
    5. For essential service staffing requirements (e.g., critical infrastructure).
  4. For situations where sheltering-in-place is directed, the PEOC Scientific Section Chief should prioritize rapid surveys, undertaken by its Environmental Radiation and Assurance Monitoring Group (ERAMG). The analysis of this information will inform the Scientific Section’s recommendations to either lift the shelter-in-place directive/order or conversely, to direct follow-up evacuations.
  5. The CMOH should consider the need to direct ITB together with sheltering-in-place, in order to provide maximum protection. This additional layer of protection may not be necessary where the PEOC Scientific Section advises that radioiodine definitively does not pose a hazard (based on analysis of reactor facility plant data).

L.2.2.2 Responsibility

Responsibility for directing sheltering-in-place rests with the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) or the LGIC, following the decision-making authorities outlined in Section 7.5 .

In circumstances where the directive is not being issued as a protective measure following an initial notification from the reactor facility, the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall consult with the following, as time permits, to determine the applicability of this measure:

  1. Scientific Section Chief regarding emission timing, intervention levels, and the appropriateness of sheltering-in-place as a protective measure
  2. affected designated municipalities
  3. CMOH to determine the need to direct ITB as a supplemental protective measure.

The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall ensure that all protective measures are issued to the public via emergency bulletin (Section 8.7.2.2 ) and that municipalities (notified through the PNOORF) are affecting the protective measures to the best of their abilities.

EBs shall contain sufficient guidance regarding the efficacy of sheltering structures (per L.2.2 above).

L.2.3 Ingestion control

L.2.3.1 General

The following protective measures for ingestion control, defined in Annex W , include:

  1. milk control
  2. water control
  3. pasture control
  4. produce and crop control
  5. livestock control
  6. wild harvested foods
  7. food and foodstuff control
  8. land control

Strategies for deciding on and implementing ingestion control measures during a nuclear or radiological emergency include the following:

  1. As a precaution, the direction of ingestion control measures during the Urgent Response Phase within the AAZ, the DPZ, and potentially the CPZ
  2. The initiation of background environmental radiation and assurance monitoring during the Urgent Response Phase if time permits
  3. The initiation of environmental radiation and assurance monitoring for the entire Ingestion Planning Zone (IPZ), at the end of the Urgent Response Phase (or beginning of the Early Response Phase), in accordance with priorities set by the ERAMG
  4. The continuation of environmental radiation and assurance monitoring during the Early Response Phase and through to the Recovery Phase to guide recovery decision-making
  5. Recommendations for implementation of additional ingestion control long-term protective actions shall be based on analysis of field monitoring data referenced against the OILs detailed in Annex L.2.5.

L.2.3.2 Responsibility

Recommendations on the application, revision, and rescinding of ingestion control measures shall be made by the PEOC Scientific Section Chief to the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander). These recommendations shall be based on an analysis of monitoring results.

The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall consult on the recommended measures with affected municipalities, where time permits.

Ingestion control measures are communicated to the municipalities via the PNOORF, and to the public via the EBs or other communications methods issued by the PEOC Commander during the Urgent and Early Response Phases (Annex N ) and, as deemed appropriate for the situation during the Recovery Phase.

Designated municipalities shall include the necessary provisions in their municipal nuclear emergency plans in order to ensure the effective implementation of the ingestion control measures for which they have associated responsibilities.

All other municipalities located in the IPZ should ensure that they have the necessary plans and procedures in place to ensure the effective implementation of the ingestion control measures for which they have associated responsibilities (e.g., shutting intake valves of affected drinking water systems).

L.2.4 Iodine Thyroid Blocking

L.2.4.1 General

Iodine Thyroid Blocking (ITB) is a protective measure normally undertaken in the Urgent Response Phase of a nuclear emergency. The ITB protective measure involves the ingestion of potassium iodide (KI) pills to prevent the thyroid gland’s uptake of radioactive iodine, one of the radioisotopes which may be present in a radioactive plume.

ITB is most effective if ingested either prior to, or soon after a radioactive emission.

Detailed ITB planning and preparedness shall be undertaken, in advance of a nuclear emergency, to ensure that the population that may be affected by the release of radioiodine has access to the pills in a timely manner.

L.2.4.2 Guidance for its use a protective measure

Because this measure protects only the thyroid gland, and only from one type of radioactive material (radioiodine), ITB should be used in combination with sheltering-in-place or evacuation. This combination provides more comprehensive, whole-body protection.

The Scientific Section determines whether ITB is required based on exceedance of the thyroid GC as determined through dose modeling. The resultant recommendation is sent to the CMOH, via the CEM, for authorization of consumption. If the CMOH authorizes the consumption of KI, the authorization is returned to the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) who will issue the consumption order within the identified area. Guidance for its use as a protective measure includes:

  1. Potassium Iodide (KI) pill ingestion should be directed 2-6 hours prior to, or immediately following exposure to an emission to be optimally effective
  2. Because this measure protects only the thyroid gland, and only from one type of radioactive element (radioiodine), ITB should be used in combination with sheltering-in-place or evacuation. This combination provides more comprehensive, whole-body protection
  3. If evacuation is not feasible, KI should be directed to be ingested using the manufacturer’s daily recommended dose, until the risk of significant radioiodine exposure (through inhalation) no longer exists. Note: certain populations (e.g., pregnant and breastfeeding women, and infants <1-month-old) should only take one dose of KI.

Further guidance is provided in the Radiation Health Response Plan and on the Ministry of Health’s website.

L.2.4.3 Preparedness

The preparedness requirements set out in this PNERP are consistent with the KI pill provisions found in CNSC regulations.  These preparedness requirements do not preclude any organization, or person, from acquiring KI pills for protection in the event of a nuclear emergency. Emergency Social Services planning should consider the need for baby formula supplies for breastfeeding mothers where ITB has been implemented.

L.2.4.4 Response considerations

Once the radioactive release has ended, provincial direction for ITB should cease unless otherwise justified.

L.2.4.5 Decision-making

During the response to the initial notification from the reactor facility that an emission is ongoing or imminent, the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall direct protective actions detailed in the appropriate site-specific implementing plan. This includes the consumption of KI pills, when authorized by the CMOH.

Subsequent ITB protective action decision-making by the CMOH will be based on the Scientific Section Chief’s technical assessment and recommendation as communicated through the CEM, and implementation will be directed in consideration of the following:

  1. The extent to which the affected public is in possession of KI pills
  2. The means and timing to access KI pills, for those who do not possess a supply
  3. Information provided through consultation with the local Medical Officer(s) of Health
  4. Based on the above, the CMOH shall direct ITB implementation, as appropriate, in coordination with the PEOC.

L.2.4.6 Provincial responsibilities

EMO and MOH, together with assistance from reactor facilities as applicable, shall develop plans, in coordination with designated municipalities within all Ontario DPZs and CPZs to ensure the availability of KI pills during an emergency. The applicable implementing plans shall include details to guide planning.

The MOH shall procure, in advance, adequate quantities of KI pills, for the Fermi 2 DPZ and CPZ.

L.2.4.7 Designated Municipality responsibilities

Designated Municipality nuclear emergency plans shall detail provisions for undertaking the following:

  1. Pre-distribution of KI pills for DPZ institutions (including schools, daycare centres, seniors’ residences, long-term care facilities, hospitals, correctional facilities etc.)
  2. Pre-distribution of KI pills for emergency centres designated under this PNERP (EWCs, Reception and Evacuation Centres, and MDUs)
  3. Pre-distribution of KI pills for households and businesses in the DPZ.
  4. Facilitating the availability of KI pills for populations within that area of the Contingency Planning Zones lying within their borders, wishing to possess a supply
  5. Detailed planning and preparedness to ensure that pills can be made available to those that may require them, during a nuclear emergency response. The four site-specific nuclear facilities (Pickering, Darlington, Bruce Power, and Fermi 2) and the Transborder PNERP Implementing Plans will provide applicable guidance for the development of emergency distribution processes and plans.

L.2.4.8 Reactor facility responsibilities

In accordance with CNSC regulations and pursuant to their responsibilities to assist offsite authorities under the Regulations of Class I Facilities (Nuclear Safety and Control Act) and operating licence requirements, reactor facilities are responsible for providing the necessary resources and support to provincial and municipal authorities to ensure that the ITB related requirements of this PNERP and of municipal emergency plans are completed.

L.2.5 Temporary relocation

L.2.5.1 General

Temporary relocation is a protective measure undertaken post-release, during the intermediate response phase, based on actual measured contamination levels. It is the displacement of people from their homes for a period beyond two weeks and up to one year to avoid chronic exposure to radiation, usually from ground contamination. Beyond one-year, permanent resettlement must be considered. Temporary relocation (i.e., relocation with a duration between two weeks and one year) requires dedicated planning and preparedness. This will be led by a multi-ministry and multi-jurisdictional planning group managing issues including housing, social services, education, etc. 

Temporary relocation can be directed as a subsequent measure to evacuation or sheltering-in-place or, as a separate measure.

The need for temporary relocation is determined following analysis of environmental radiation monitoring results and assessment against OILs (Annex L.2.5).

EMO shall consider a variety of factors (optimization) before recommending temporary relocation as the potential impacts of this action may not be justified in areas where the OIL for temporary relocation is minimally exceeded. The CEM on the technical advice of the Scientific Section and the operational advice of the other PEOC sections, will make a recommendation to government on the appropriateness of temporary relocation.

L.2.5.2 Responsibility

In collaboration with relevant ministry officials and following consultation with the affected designated municipalities and designated host municipalities, the CEM shall make recommendations regarding the need for temporary relocation. 

Temporary relocation shall be directed through public communications issued by the CEM in coordination with the PEOC Provincial Information Management Section (PIMS).

Relocation planning involves a significant interdisciplinary approach, involving at minimum:

  1. Transportation management (e.g., Ministry of Transportation)
  2. Reception and evacuation centres (e.g., designated municipalities)
  3. Long-term housing (e.g., multi-ministry and multi-jurisdictional planning group)
  4. Access to health services and public health issues – coordinated by the Ministry of Health. 

L.2.6 Decontamination

L.2.6.1 General

In nuclear and radiological emergencies, personal monitoring determines the presence of contamination on any individual who may be contaminated after a radiological release to the environment. Decontamination serves to reduce or remove contamination. Personal monitoring and decontamination are used to mitigate the exposure effects of external contamination.

Facilities and provisions for personal monitoring and decontamination shall be established and resourced with the specialized equipment and expertise required to undertake this function.

In nuclear and radiological emergencies, population monitoring and medical management (Annex S ) refers to the process undertaken by the MOH to assess long term health impacts, following the personal monitoring and decontamination that is undertaken at MDUs.

With the exception of Fermi 2, personal monitoring and decontamination are not expected to be needed for a transborder emergency.

L.2.6.2 Responsibility

The operators of the Bruce, Darlington, and Pickering NGS have responsibility for the radiation monitoring and decontamination activities at emergency centres established for the public and for emergency workers in a nuclear emergency.

For a nuclear emergency at the Fermi 2 NPP, EMO is responsible for coordinating, in advance, arrangements for monitoring and decontamination for evacuees and for emergency workers.

Designated Municipalities shall ensure that their municipal emergency plans include provisions for the establishment, administration and operation of the non-radiological components of centres housing the monitoring and decontamination facilities for the public and for emergency workers.

L.2.6.3 Designated communities

Reactor facilities in Ontario are responsible for providing resources, qualified staff and their training in order to meet their responsibility for the monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers (see section above) in their designated community.

EMO shall co-ordinate with appropriate relevant partners to establish arrangements for monitoring and decontamination of both emergency workers and evacuees as outlined in Sections 8.8 and 8.10 for the Town of Amherstburg.