Chapter 8 Nuclear emergency response functions

8.1 Overview

The emergency response functions identified in this section are consistent with the functional requirements identified in the IAEA’s Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and CSA N1600 – General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs.

8.2 Detection

The responsibility for the detection of an issue that may result in a nuclear emergency rests primarily with the operators of Ontario’s NGSs. NGSs in Ontario have robust procedures in place that will provide indicators of a problem that may deteriorate into a nuclear emergency. Hence, a nuclear emergency should not happen without a significant amount of warning (i.e., days or longer). However, the NGS operator is not responsible for offsite response, and thus, does not maintain detection capabilities in the communities and environment outside of its fence line.

The province is responsible for offsite response and shall operate and maintain a detection network capable of detecting a release from a nuclear reactor operating within Ontario, or from a nearby NGS for which emergency planning zones (EPZ) extend into the province. The network shall be capable of continuously monitoring the environment for gamma radiation, and automatically informing the Scientific Section Duty Scientist if elevated readings are detected. The density of the detector network shall be such that it is unlikely for a release to go undetected.

Upon detection of elevated readings where no notification of a problem has been received from an NGS, these readings shall be verified before further response actions are triggered. Verification may be achieved when multiple detectors on the network detect an increase in radiation levels or when an independent detector used in the same vicinity as the initiating detector confirms the presence of radiation above normal background for unknown reasons. Once verified, the province will investigate and if warranted, take the appropriate actions to protect the public as detailed herein.

8.3 Categorization

Categorizing a potential nuclear emergency is solely the responsibility of the NGS operator. Categorizations include:

1. Reportable Event
2. Abnormal Incident
3. Onsite Emergency (notification of Onsite Emergency will include whether a release is expected within 12 hours or is more that 12 hours away)
4. General Emergency.

A detailed list of accident characteristics associated with each categorization is available in Annex P . Following diagnosis of the event onsite, the reactor facility Shift Manager categorizes the event and, within 15 minutes (CNSC Regulatory Document 2.10.1, section 2.2.2(5)(b)), notifies the province, the CNSC and designated municipalities. For each categorization, the PEOC adopts an activation level (Table 1).

Within 15 minutes of ending the confirmatory notification call with the reactor facility, the PEOC notifies designated municipalities and the OPP of the provincial offsite response level declared (i.e., the recipients of the Provincial Notification of Offsite Response Form (PNOORF)). At Partial and Full Activation, MTO is also informed.

8.4 Notification and Activation

8.4.1 Initial Notification

Initial notification for a nuclear emergency is defined as the notification made by the reactor facility to designated offsite authorities whenever an event occurs or conditions arise, which require such notification under the prescribed criteria. The initial notification period starts with the first notification and end after four hours, when the Scientific Section is established and receiving adequate information to assess the emergency at the incident NGS.

Canadian reactor facilities are required to notify the CNSC within 15 minutes of activation of their emergency response organization (CNSC Regulatory Document 2.10.1, section 2.2.2).

8.4.1.1 Purpose

The purpose of the initial notification and response system is to:

1. Inform offsite authorities of the fact that a notifiable event or situation has occurred at the reactor facility
2. Provide an indication, through the notification category system, to all relevant partners as to the appropriate initial offsite response in the initial stage of an emergency.

8.4.1.2 Application

These provisions apply to notification from reactor facilities located in Ontario, or those in contiguous American states. The specific initial notification criteria and provincial offsite response level for each reactor facility is described in the applicable site-specific implementing plan.

8.4.1.3 Internal Notification

Each organization or agency required to respond to a nuclear emergency should have an internal notification system to inform all concerned staff of the imminence or occurrence of an emergency under this plan, and of the appropriate response to the notification.

8.4.1.4 External Notification

Organizations or agencies which might be affected by a nuclear emergency under this plan, or which may be required to assist in response, should be notified at an appropriate stage by their links in the ERO. The responsibility for making such notification shall be described in the relevant Implementing Plan.

8.4.1.5 System Outline

In accordance with federal law and regulations under which they operate (i.e., Nuclear Safety and Control Act and CNSC’s Regulatory Document (REGDOC) 2.10.1, or applicable US regulations), the reactor facility’s nuclear emergency response plan shall include provisions to:

1. Notify offsite authorities of an accidental release or the imminence of an accidental release
2. Describe how these events are determined and categorized
3. Describe the immediate notification process.

A site-specific initial notification and response system has been developed, in consultation with each Ontario nuclear operator, to facilitate a timely emergency notification categorization which corresponds to initial provincial and municipal response actions.

The category notification form from the reactor facility shall include the notification categorization (see Table 1). Where more than one criterion is applicable, the highest category triggered shall be reported in the notification. The criterion used to determine the categorization is contained within the Implementing Plan for each NGS.

Once notified of an initial categorization or recategorization, the PEOC Duty Officer (DO) will inform the PEOC Commander of the categorization. The PEOC Commander shall inform the CEM or designate and a decision will be made by the CEM or designate (e.g. the PEOC Commander) on the appropriate provincial offsite response level to be adopted. This level should normally be the one linked to the category notification form received from the NGS (as indicated in Table 1) unless another level is judged to be more appropriate. The provincial offsite response level must be transmitted to designated municipalities (Annex O ) and other PNOORF recipients within 15 minutes, and then communicated to rest of provincial ERO via IMS Form 201. Site-specific provisions for each provincial offsite response level can be found in the relevant Implementing Plan. Contiguous states and provinces shall only be notified of an Abnormal Incident notification or higher (8.4.4 below).

If, at any time during the emergency, the assessment of the onsite situation changes to warrant a different category than the last one communicated, the reactor facility shall issue an update within 15 minutes of re-categorization to the designated provincial and municipal contact points.

The initial notification period of the emergency ends once ongoing reporting by the reactor facility EOC to the Scientific Section of the PEOC is established. Thereafter, any change in plant situation will be communicated by the reactor facility EOC to the PEOC Duty Officer and the PEOC Scientific Section as part of the regular reporting, as agreed to under the Reactor Facility responsibilities stated in the Annex G .

Following any change in categorization communicated by the reactor facility in this initial stage, the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) will normally consult with the Scientific Section Chief or Duty Scientist on the technical situation to determine any need for change to the provincial offsite response level. Otherwise, the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) will reference Table 1 to decide on the provincial offsite response level.

The CEM or designate (e.g., PEOC Commander) can, at any time, direct that a change be made to increase the provincial offsite response level.

Once appropriate, the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) may terminate the offsite response and notify all relevant partners of the termination.

To ensure a timely and appropriate nuclear notification system, EMO/PEOC shall maintain 24/7 contact point and alternate backup and detailed notification procedures.

Upon receipt of a category notification form from a reactor facility:

1. The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall confirm the provincial offsite response level to be adopted
2. The PEOC DO shall draft, and the PEOC Commander will authorise the issuance of, a Provincial Notification of Offsite Response Form (PNOORF) and an IMS Form 201 for applicable EROs
3. EROs should, upon receipt of the PNOORF or an IMS 201 or 209, adopt the appropriate, corresponding response level prescribed in their respective plans prepared in alignment with this PNERP
4. Following this initial provincial offsite response level decision, EMO may upgrade/downgrade the response level in support of the operational needs of the situation.

The PEOC, under direction of the CEM or delegate (e.g. PEOC Commander), may adopt a provincial offsite response level that is different from the default provincial offsite response level illustrated in Table 1 (as appropriate) and may notify the ERO on the basis of the chosen offsite response level.

8.4.2 Activation Criteria

When a Partial (8.4.4) or Full Activation (8.4.5) response is adopted, the PEOC shall use the provincial public alerting system (8.7.2.1 ), which includes the Alert Ready system, to issue an EB informing the affected public of the following:

1. That a problem exists
2. The area affected
3. To stay tuned to the media for further information, and
4. Precautionary and protective measures being directed.

Protective measures may be rescinded using priority communication methods. EBs will not be used to rescind protective measures. Rescinding of protective measures is further addressed in the Provincial Nuclear Recovery Operations Plan (PNROP).

8.4.3 Routine Monitoring

The province, through the PEOC Duty Officer, maintains a state of Routine Monitoring. No additional staff are required to support Routine Monitoring as an offsite response level.

8.4.4 Activation to Enhanced Monitoring or Partial Activation

Upgrading the PEOC’s offsite response level will make additional resources available to the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) to assess the ongoing situation developing at the NGS. At Enhanced Monitoring, staff provide support to the PEOC Commander as required, and are put on notice that they may be recalled at any time. At this time, the Duty Scientist assumes the role of the Chief of the Scientific Section and recommends to the PEOC Commander whether the remainder of the Scientific Section should be placed on standby or activated. EMO is responsible for managing and maintaining a system to recall PEOC staff in the event a recall is required (as of publication, Send Word Now).

At Partial Activation, PEOC staff are notified of the activation level and will assess and respond to the emergency (see 6) as the situation dictates. Recalled personnel will report to the PEOC or Alternate PEOC as directed and will be accounted for upon their arrival. Rotation of personnel will be noted in the appropriate log for each section, and planning for rotation should begin once the section is activated. Depending on the situation, virtual attendance in the PEOC may be authorized by the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander).

8.4.5 Full Activation

At full activation, the PEOC shall be fully staffed 24/7 and organized as seen in Figure 6. Provincial actions normally taken when Full Activation is ordered are listed in Section 8.5.4. It should be noted, however, that these actions may need to be adapted at the time to suit the specific situation/local conditions.

This diagram is for visual reference only. See the text below this figure for the full description.

Image

Figure 6 : PEOC at Partial and Full Activation

The diagram illustrates the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) at Partial and Full Activation. The Lieutenant Governor in Council and the Premier have the highest authority, followed by the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Management. Directly beneath them is the Deputy Minister's Steering Committee on Emergency Management, which connects to the Commissioner of Emergency Management. The Commissioner links to the PEOC, where Command and Coordination staff include PEOC Command, the Provincial Chief Emergency Information Officer, and a Safety Officer. Below this group are six functional sections: Operations, Planning, Logistics, Finance and Administration, Public Information Management, and Scientific. These sections are connected to Ministry Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs), Municipal EOCs, and Federal Government EOCs.

8.4.6 Activation of ERAMG and NEAT

At Enhanced Monitoring, the NEAT will be fully operation and the ERAMG will be on standby.  At PEOC Partial or Full Activation, both the ERAMG and the NEAT will be fully operational.

8.4.7 Activation of the UTCC

Activation of the UTCC begins with MTO Duty Officer’s receipt of the PNOORF indicating a provincial offsite response level of Partial or Full Activation, which will trigger activation of the UTCC by MTO. The MTO Duty Officer will be notified of a potential emergency when the PEOC activates to Enhanced Monitoring, which ensures the UTCC is prepared for a potential escalation of the provincial offsite response level. Following receipt of the PNOORF, the MTO Duty Officer will connect with the appropriate UTCC leads based on the location of the incident to share any initial intelligence, and to confirm the following details:

1. anticipated UTCC membership
2. member roles (including identification of the Operations Lead and the Planning Lead for the UTCC)
3. UTCC meeting time and format (physical/virtual)
4. anticipated operational cycle.

8.4.8 Activation of other EROs

Other ministries will be notified through the release of IMS Forms 201 and 209, which is released by the PEOC Commander at Routine Monitoring or higher. Upon receipt of either form, those EROs will assess the information presented and activate their EOCs as appropriate.

8.4.9 Emergency Organizations’ Situational Awareness

The PEOC functions to support and coordinate the efforts of the entire ERO, comprised of organizations with nuclear emergency responsibilities.

The PEOC shall support the situational awareness of other responding organizations to ensure the timely coordination of response efforts and to minimize duplication of effort when and where possible. Information may be exchanged through the PNOORF, IMS forms, web-based applications (e.g., MS Teams meetings), conference calls, group emails, and dispatched LOs and Field Officers.

The PEOC coordinates the virtual and physical deployment of provincial staff to designated municipalities and host municipalities (see Annex O ) emergency operations and information centres, as appropriate and as available, to provide support and advice through liaison with the PEOC.

Event coordination briefings with the provincial ERO, chaired by the PEOC Commander, shall be conducted at least once per operational cycle to:

1. update on the current situation
2. update on major tasks undertaken by each organization
3. discuss new and ongoing risks
4. identify potential conflicts
5. identify new support needs

The PEOC shall outline the response coordination strategy adopted by the ERO for the operational period.

The CEM or delegate (e.g. PEOC Commander) is responsible for ensuring the continuing practice of justification and optimization of protective actions, using the tools developed in the PNEPF and, in consultation with the designated municipalities (Annex I ) and appropriate members of the ERO (see Section 5 of the Provincial Emergency Response Plan).

8.5 Initial Response

8.5.1 Routine Monitoring

At Routine Monitoring, the PEOC Duty Officer, the Duty Scientist, and the PEOC Commander are required to monitor the situation until it has been resolved or upgraded to a higher activation level.

8.5.2 Enhanced Monitoring

Enhanced Monitoring is normally adopted in response to an Abnormal Incident (or Alert for US facilities only) notification from a reactor facility. This response level requires some coordination, planning, and/or monitoring activities, without the need to activate the full response organization. As such, staffing of the PEOC may include:

1. IMS Sections shall be stood-up, according to the needs of the PEOC during that operational period(the Duty Scientist or representatives of the Scientific Section would be critical)
2. Ministries and other organizations that are directly involved in the response, deploying LOs to the PEOC
3. Deployment of provincial staff to liaise with communities, depending on the needs of the situation
4. The PIMS, or components of it, at the direction of the PCEIO.

All Routine Monitoring activities continue to be carried out at Enhanced Monitoring, as well as a combination of the following:

1. Contingency planning for protective action response, where an escalation of the situation may be expected
2. Situational assessment by the Duty Scientist based on information and data from the reactor facility in regular transmittals and direct outreach
3. Consideration of the need to pre-position resources (e.g., ERAMG Field Teams)
4. Coordination with designated municipalities, ministries, or other key response partners as applicable
5. Distribution of event-specific information products, as detailed in the PEOC Response Procedures.

At Enhanced Monitoring, the PEOC Commander shall:

1. Set an operational period for the provincial ERO
2. Initiate the development of an IAP, as detailed in the PEOC Response Procedures
3. Utilize the PEOC Duty Team (consisting of operations staff, scientific staff, reactor facility operator representative(s), PIMS staff, and others as required) to monitor the situation and notify the ERO of changes to the provincial response or planned course of action
4. Begin conducting regular event coordination briefings, as detailed in the PEOC Response Procedures.

8.5.3 Partial Activation

At Partial Activation, PEOC and municipal EOCs shall be fully staffed 24/7. Provincial actions at Partial Activation include:

1. Ministry EOCs and the UTCC to be staffed to the level appropriate for the situation, allowing monitoring and assessment of the situation on a continuous basis and implementation of associated plans, as considered appropriate
2. Upon receipt of station parameters from the reactor facility, and prior to a release, dose modelling and potential plume dispersion will be used to determine the potential impact of a release. The URI dose modelling tool is provided to the Scientific Section by the NGS Operators
3. Within a few hours of notification of an Abnormal Incident or higher, the Scientific and other Sections of the PEOC are staffed, as appropriate to the response level, and an operational/business cycle for information gathering and decision-making is established to facilitate the response
4. In the event that protective measures become necessary, the following EMO actions will be assessed and decided upon by the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander):
   1. The need to upgrade to Full Activation response
   2. The need for, and timing of, precautionary measures, operational actions, and/or urgent response actions and applicable recommendations to provincial executive authorities; these are based on Scientific Section technical assessment / recommendations and operational situation input / recommendations of the other PEOC Section Chiefs
   3. The need for, and timing of, EBs to be issued to the affected public
   4. The need for emergency public information issued through news releases and media briefings
   5. The need for the establishment of a J-EIC (by MEPR Communications Branch) to facilitate media briefings. These would be held by a provincial spokesperson together with representatives from other ministries, federal departments, the reactor facility, designated municipalities and other organizations as necessary
5. This system of operational and technical awareness, decision-making and emergency public information sharing is repeated, according to the PEOC operational/business cycle, until the emergency response is terminated.

Actions taken at the municipal level include:

1. Municipal ERO staff directed to begin taking response actions, or be on standby to take response actions, as appropriate
2. Issue notification placing municipal departments on standby
3. Emergency Information Centres (EICs) are to be established
4. Other emergency centres (e.g., Emergency Worker Centres, Evacuation Centres, Reception Centres) readied to become operational without undue delay.

8.5.4 Full Activation

At Full Activation, all of the actions required at Partial Activation will be completed or continued as necessary. Organizations and emergency centres that are stood-up at Partial Activation are now fully operational.

In the early hours of a nuclear emergency, the full technical assessment and decision-making capabilities will require time to stand up. In the highly unlikely event that the initial notification indicates an ongoing or imminent release, and where protective actions must be implemented to protect public health and safety prior to a full technical assessment being completed, urgent response actions have been pre-defined for the Commissioner of Emergency Management or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander). Urgent response actions are implemented to protect public health and safety until a more fulsome technical assessment can be undertaken, which may result in revision to protective actions. Urgent response actions include:

1. Public alerting initiated via provincial (Alert Ready) and municipal alerting systems
2. The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) will normally:
   1. Direct the implementation of protective measures in the AAZ and/or the DPZ
   2. Direct precautionary measures in the AAZ and DPZ
   3. Issue an emergency bulletin advising the affected public of the above protective measures and where to get more information.

Following the implementation of the urgent response actions above or, for an escalating emergency that has reached Full Activation, the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) determines the need for additional protective measures:

1. Through an assessment of potential venting strategies (see Section 8.6.4) based on NGS plant parameters
2. Through the Scientific Section’s assessment of field survey results from ERAMG
3. If so required, evacuations will be initiated for those sectors of the DPZ, closest to the reactor facility, in all directions, prior to the radioactive release. The entire DPZ may be directed to evacuate if NEAT’s analysis determines the need (Note: federal agencies (e.g., Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, etc.) are notified about protective measures through the GOC)
4. Where there is a risk of contamination of food, water, milk, or commodities, the public may be advised to:
   1. Remove animals from pasture and place grazing animals on stored (covered) feed
   2. Restrict the consumption of some sources of drinking water until further assessments are performed
   3. Restrict consumption and distribution of local produce, foods that are fished, foraged or hunted, milk from grazing animals, rainwater, and animal feed
   4. Restrict distribution of commodities until further assessments are performed.

Actions undertaken at the municipal level include:

1. Local Reception and Evacuation Centres are fully operational at pre-determined facilities outside of the DPZ; reception Centres can provide registration and inquiry, health, and psychosocial services, as well as connections to accommodation for those who require it
2. Local Monitoring and Decontamination Units (MDU) are fully operational and located at fixed sites, including co-location with Reception Centres or, may be set up as mobile units for deployment where needed. These offsite facilities provide monitoring and decontamination facilities
3. Local Emergency Worker Centres (EWC) are fully operational and established at pre-determined facilities outside the DPZ and are used as an entry control point for all offsite municipal, provincial, and federal emergency workers accessing the affected area; appropriately trained staff resource the EWC to provide monitoring and decontamination services.

Once the radioactive emission (if any) has ended, the ERAMG:

1. Dispatches field-based survey and sampling teams who, using vehicle, ground, and aerial surveys, report on areas of deposition within and beyond the DPZ
2. Assesses the results of surveys against pre-determined Operational Intervention Levels (OILs), to identify areas where additional protective actions or further investigation may be warranted, or where protective measures should be rescinded
3. Dispatches field-based sampling teams once the boundaries of hot spots and other areas of contamination have been determined; these teams conduct sampling of milk, water, crops, produce and food and foodstuffs that are fished, foraged, or hunted to support the determination of the continued need for ingestion control measures. Foodstuff that may fall outside of any other category, but could still serve as a route of radiological exposure, include honey, maple syrup, herbs used for smudging, etc.

8.5.5 Nuclear Emergency Response Phases

Nuclear emergency response phases are used to situate response organizations in the timeline of an emergency as it relates to a potential release of nuclear material from the incident NGS. There are four phases to a nuclear emergency; the Urgent Response Phase, the Early Response Phase, the Transition Phase and the Recovery Phase (see Table 2).

Detailed information on these phases can be found in Annex N . The Recovery Phase is detailed in greater detail in the Provincial Nuclear Recovery Operations Plan.

8.6 Ongoing Response

Ongoing response requirements will be communicated to the EROs using updated PNOORF (designated recipients) and IMS Form 201 or 209 and coordination calls (e.g., MS Teams) as detailed in Table 3.

8.6.1 Precautionary Measures

Precautionary measures (Annex L ) are not considered urgent response actions (8.6.2 ), since the timing of their implementation is at the discretion of the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander), depending on how the nuclear emergency is unfolding. Precautionary measures should be implemented during the Urgent Response Phase either in advance of, or in combination with, urgent response actions to facilitate their implementation. Unlike protective measures (see Section 8.6.6 ), precautionary measures are not associated with a numerical intervention level.

The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) will direct precautionary measures as appropriate, and where time permits, in consultation with applicable responsible ministries and the affected designated municipalities. Designated and host Municipalities, First Nation and Indigenous communities, and implicated ministries will be informed of precautionary measures by the PEOC.

Precautionary measures shall be directed via EBs (Section 8.7.2.2 ) issued by the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) to the affected public as well as through normal public communications channels.

Precautionary measures include (but are not limited to):

1. closing of beaches, recreation areas, etc.
2. closing of workplaces and schools
3. suspension of non-critical patient admissions in hospitals
4. entry control.

8.6.2 Implementation of Urgent Response Actions

Urgent response actions are implemented once a specific categorization is made by the NGS. Urgent response actions are taken in pre-designated zones, with each zone created for a specific purpose.

8.6.2.1 Actions at Onsite Emergency (no anticipated release within 12 hours)

If the release is not anticipated within 12 hours, but the NGS has categorized an Onsite Emergency, the PEOC should adopt Partial Activation (for details, see Section 8.4.4 ), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications, including the municipal contact points and host communities. In addition, consideration shall be given to issuing an EB (Section 6.4), a news release or both. Finally, Ministry EOCs and the UTCC are to be established and appropriately staffed.

8.6.2.2 Actions at Onsite Emergency (release anticipated within 12 hours)

If a release is anticipated within 12 hours, the PEOC shall activate to Full Activation and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (Section 8.4.1.3 and Section 8.4.1.4 respectively), including the host community.

Once the release is expected to occur within 12 hours, the PEOC shall:

1. Issue the appropriate emergency bulletin (Section 8.7.2.2 )
2. Issue operational directives implementing the following urgent response actions, unless there are good reasons for modifying this response, for:
   1. Sheltering (Annex L.2.2 ) in the AAZ
   2. Suspension of road and rail traffic through the AAZ
   3. Clearance of all boaters in appropriate lake sectors impacted
3. Issue further EBs, as appropriate
4. Order PIMS staff to issue news releases, as appropriate
5. Order that the UTCC and Ministry EOCs be established
6. Assess venting requirements (see Section 8.6.4)
7. Assess the situation for further action.

8.6.2.3 Actions at General Emergency

Once a General Emergency categorization is received from the incident site NGS, the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall implement the following actions, unless alternative actions are justified by operational or logistical constraints:

1. Notify and ensure that the municipal contacts have activated the public alerting system (Section 8.7.2.1 )
2. Issue the appropriate EB (Section 8.7.2.2 )
3. Issue operational directives implementing the following urgent response actions (assuming conditions allow):
   1. Evacuation of the AAZ and appropriate Lake Sectors
   2. Suspension of road, rail and air traffic throughout the AAZ
   3. Precautionary measures in the DPZ
4. Assess venting requirements (see Section 8.6.4 )
5. If emission is ongoing, or if evacuations will not be completed prior to emission, issue operational directives implementing the protective measures for:
   1. Evacuees caught in a release (e.g., those that self-evacuated when they were asked to shelter-in-place) shall report for contamination monitoring or, if not possible, to evacuate to a destination beyond the DPZ and undertake self-decontamination
   2. For those in the AAZ sheltering-in-place during a release (i.e., those that cannot evacuate), ingestion of potassium iodide (KI) pills (Annex L.2.4 )
   3. Sheltering (Annex L.2.2 ) in the rest of the DPZ. Otherwise, take this action 4 hours (or, at a time deemed appropriate) before the expected time of commencement of the release.
6. Adopt Full Activation (8.4.5 ), and initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (Sections 8.4.1.3 and 8.4.1.4 respectively), including the host community
7. Issue further EBs, as appropriate.
8. Order PIMS staff to issue news releases, as appropriate.
9. Order that Ministry EOCs and UTCC be established (if not done at an earlier stage).
10. Assess the situation for further action.

8.6.2.4 Expanding on Initial Actions

After urgent response actions are taken, the Scientific Section shall assess whether expansion of specific zones is necessary based on projected offsite doses as compared to generic criteria (GC). While a release is ongoing and after it has ended, the Scientific Section shall assess whether expansion of specific zones is necessary based on the field measurements and OILs. The Scientific Section Chief shall make recommendations to the CEM through the PEOC Commander to expand the area for evacuation, expand the area for shelter-in-place, expand the area for ingestion control or a combination thereof as the radiological situation dictates. See Annex Q for more details.

8.6.2.5 Deviation Process

During a provincial declaration of emergency, the LGIC or Premier may authorize operational or protective measures which deviate from the PNERP through emergency orders, subject to the conditions and criteria under the EMCPA. Additionally, the LGIC or Premier may authorize the necessary resources (human, physical, informational, and financial) required to support the proposed deviation.

If deviations are required, then all participating EOCs shall be informed through an updated PNOORF or IMS Forms 201 and 209, as well as during interagency conference calls/web meetings.

8.6.3 Declaring a provincial emergency

8.6.3.1 Authority

The EMCPA sets out provisions for the declaration of a provincial emergency throughout Ontario or in any part of Ontario. Subject to the criteria for declaring an emergency as set out in the EMCPA (see 8.6.3.2 below), the LGIC has the authority by order to declare that an emergency exists throughout Ontario or in any part of Ontario. If in the Premier’s opinion the urgency of the situation requires that an order be made immediately, the Premier may also by order declare that an emergency exists.

During a provincial declaration of emergency, emergency orders may be made under sections 7.0.2 and 7.1 of the EMCPA subject to certain criteria, limitations, conditions and other legal considerations.

Additionally, pursuant to subsection 7.0.3(2), if a provincial declaration of emergency order is made under section 7.0.1 of the EMCPA and the emergency area or any part of it is within the jurisdiction of a municipality, the Premier, where he or she considers it necessary, may by order made under this section,

(a)  direct and control the administration, facilities and equipment of the municipality in the emergency area, and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the exercise by the municipality of its powers and duties in the emergency area, whether under an emergency plan or otherwise, is subject to the direction and control of the Premier; and

(b)  require any municipality to provide such assistance as he or she considers necessary to an emergency area or any part of the emergency area that is not within the jurisdiction of the municipality and direct and control the provision of such assistance.

Pursuant to the EMCPA a municipality is authorized to exercise a municipal power in response to an order of the Premier or his or her delegate made under subsection (2) without a by-law.

8.6.3.2 Criteria for a provincial declaration of emergency

Pursuant to 7.0.1(3) of the EMCPA, the following criteria must be satisfied in order to declare a provincial emergency: 

1. There is an emergency that requires immediate action to prevent, reduce or mitigate a danger of major proportions that could result in serious harm to persons or substantial damage to property.
2. One of the following circumstances exists:
   1. The resources normally available to a ministry of the Government of Ontario or an agency, board or commission or other branch of the government, including existing legislation, cannot be relied upon without the risk of serious delay.
   2. The resources referred to in subparagraph I may be insufficiently effective to address the emergency.
   3. It is not possible, without the risk of serious delay, to ascertain whether the resources referred to in subparagraph I can be relied upon.

8.6.3.3 Termination of a Provincial Emergency Declaration

A provincial emergency declared under EMCPA section 7.0.1 is terminated at the end of the 14th day following its declaration unless the LGIC by order declares it to be terminated at an earlier date. The LGIC may by order extend an emergency before it is terminated for one further period of no more than 14 days. As often as required, the Legislative Assembly may, by resolution and on the recommendation of the Premier, extend the period of an emergency for additional periods of no more than 28 days.

In accordance with subsection 7.0.1(2) of the EMCPA, a provincial declaration of emergency made by the Premier under subsection 7.0.1(1) of the EMCPA is terminated after 72 hours, unless the provincial declaration of emergency is confirmed by order of the LGIC before it terminates.

8.6.3.4 Municipal Declarations

Pursuant to EMCPA Subsection 4(1), the Head of Council of a municipality may declare that an emergency exists in the municipality or in any part thereof and may take such action and make such orders as he or she considers necessary and are not contrary to law to implement the emergency plan of the municipality and to protect property and the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the emergency area.

1. The Head of Council should consider making such a declaration whenever the municipal nuclear emergency plan is activated.
2. When a radiological emergency occurs that requires activation of the local emergency plan, the Head of Council should consider declaring an emergency.

Pursuant to EMCPA Subsection 4(3), heads of council shall ensure that the Minister responsible for emergency management is notified forthwith whenever a municipal emergency is declared or terminated.       

Pursuant to subsection 4(4) of the EMCPA, the Premier may at any time declare that an emergency has terminated.

Pursuant to EMCPA Subsection 4(2), the Head of Council or the council of a municipality may at any time declare that an emergency has terminated.

Considerations for municipalities declaring an emergency could include:

1. Whenever the municipal nuclear emergency plan is activated.
2. When a radiological emergency occurs that requires activation of the local emergency plan.

8.6.4 Venting Containment Strategy

8.6.4.1 General

Should the reactor design require a venting containment strategy, the impacted NGS may need to vent its containment structure to maintain the integrity of the overall containment system. The requirement to vent is typically known well in advance of the intended venting time and this is especially the case for a DBA. Information associated with venting from containment hold-up systems, in an accident situation, can help to inform protective action decision-making.

The Pickering, Bruce and Darlington NGSs are equipped with sub-atmospheric containment systems designed to hold, for periods of time, radioactive material released from failed nuclear fuel in an accident.

8.6.4.2 Aim of the Venting Strategy

The ability to control (within certain limits) the venting of radioactivity from containment systems within a venting window could be useful to allow prior implementation of protective actions before the release takes place.

Information about characteristics of the venting strategy, including wind direction, duration, whether the release is expected to be continuous or intermittent, and whether the release could be interrupted to allow additional protective actions can be used to support protective action decision-making.

Any decision to use a venting strategy (nominal or alternate), should be taken only after consultation among the province, CNSC, the reactor facility, and affected municipalities and First Nation and Indigenous communities which are in, or have traditional territories in, the EPZs or IPZ. In situations where venting must be performed in an urgent manner to protect the structural integrity of containment, the venting consultation may be delayed until after venting has commenced but must be conducted as soon as practicable.

8.6.4.3 Nominal Venting Strategy

In most CANDU reactor accident scenarios, released nuclear materials from the reactor building will be drawn into the vacuum building. The nominal venting strategy is to commence venting through an emergency venting system shortly before the vacuum building repressurizes to atmospheric pressure, and to continue venting at a rate just sufficient to keep containment sub-atmospheric. Controlled venting may be employed for a prolonged period (days, weeks, or months) until the internal sources of airborne contamination are removed, have decayed, or are otherwise contained. 

8.6.4.4 Other Venting Strategies

Other venting strategies which do not activate the vacuum building containment system are possible, as well:

1. Radioactivity may be confined to other parts of the containment system, and vented through other exhaust systems, such as the contaminated exhaust stack, which contains equipment capable of removing most of the radioactive materials from the exhaust.
2. As part of post-Fukushima improvements, some Ontario reactors have had passive containment filtered venting systems installed. These systems provide an additional backup to the filtered air discharge system that can run during a station power outage.

8.6.4.5 Containment Venting Responsibilities

Reactor facility emergency response plans include:

1. Provision for a designated person with the authority to initiate and suspend venting.
2. Provision for consultation with the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander), (CNSC, and affected municipalities and First Nation and Indigenous communities) prior to undertaking any venting activity unless venting must be performed in an urgent manner to protect the structural integrity of containment.
3. A requirement to provide time estimates, to EMO, indicating when venting will be required.
4. A requirement to inform the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander), as early as possible, if venting must be performed in an urgent manner to protect the structural integrity of containment.

The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander), as operational lead for the offsite response, should initiate the following measures as appropriate to the venting situation:

1. If time allows, consult with the appropriate relevant partners, including the applicable designated municipalities, and First Nation and Indigenous communities, on the proposed protective measures in light of the venting strategy to be initiated.
2. In coordination with the GOC, Transport Canada and NAV CANADA, notify and restrict air traffic in the vicinity of the station before venting is initiated.
3. In coordination with the police of jurisdiction, and where applicable, the Canadian Coast Guard, notify and restrict marine traffic in the adjacent lake/river sectors before venting is initiated.
4. Confirm through the federal LOs in the PEOC that the federal government has initiated consultations with the affected U.S. jurisdictions.
5. Issue the appropriate EBs to the affected population.
6. Following the decision-making authorities outlined in Section 7.5, direct or recommend the appropriate protective measures in any populated area prior to venting being carried out.

The nuclear emergency response plans and procedures of organizations with responsibilities related to venting should identify how venting decisions are established, documented, approved, and communicated.

8.6.5 Liquid Emissions

Where a liquid emission has occurred at a reactor facility in conjunction with an event that meets the notification category system as detailed in the site-specific implementing plans (Pickering, Darlington, Bruce Power), it shall be dealt with under the applicable site-specific implementing plan.

8.6.6 Protective Measures

Protective measures are designed to protect individuals from unnecessary exposure to radiation during a nuclear emergency, thereby limiting any potential health effects. Some of these measures are applied as urgent response actions in the AAZ and the DPZ, once the emergency is categorized as an Onsite Emergency (with an imminent release) or a General Emergency. Protective measures taken at different phases of the emergency have different names and decision-making processes. These include:

1. Urgent Response Actions: Taken based on the categorization from the NGS Urgent Response Actions include sheltering, evacuation, KI pill ingestion, ingestion control, protective clothing, respiratory protection, staying indoors and self decontamination.
2. Protective Actions: Taken during or after a release, based on radiological surveys from the field and compared against OILs; Protective Actions include sheltering-in-place, evacuation, KI pill ingestion, ingestion control, protective clothing, respiratory protection, and decontamination.
3. Long-Term Protective Actions: Taken after all releases have ended and there is an existing exposure situation; these actions include temporary relocation, resettlement, and ingestion control. 

Precautionary measures can be taken at any time at the discretion of the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander). Precautionary measures include closing beaches and recreational areas, closing workspaces and schools, suspension of non-critical patient admission to hospitals, and entry controls.

Table 4 provides a summary of protective measures for each response phase.

The guiding principles of the PNERP (Annex A , para A.1 g), dictates that protective measures shall be implemented to prevent acute (deterministic) effects and should be implemented to prevent or reduce chronic (stochastic) effects to the public. Flexibility must be built into all plans and procedures to allow for the optimization and justification of protective measures in response to the changing nature of the emergency and its consequences for public health and safety.

Table 4 : Summary of Protective Measures by Offsite Emergency Phase

Once the PEOC Scientific Section activates the ERAMG field teams, and data is received and analyzed, these protective measures can be adjusted or new ones directed based on operational, technical (e.g., monitoring data applied against OILs, (Annex Q.2), and public policy considerations.

Detailed information regarding direction and implementation of precautionary and protective measures will be developed and communicated as follows:

1. During the preparedness stage through public awareness and education by the applicable responsibilities as defined in the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Framework;
2. During the emergency, through public direction (Section 8.7 ).

8.6.6.1 Revising Protective Measures

Protective measures implemented as urgent protective actions may need to be revised as the incident evolves as a result of the accident being more or less severe than anticipated, or because of inherent limitations to modeling.  After the release has ended, protective measures shall be revised based upon the measured level of radiological contamination in the environment, and the resulting dose rate to individuals in the local area. Revising protective measures (Annex L ) shall require the input and analysis of the Scientific Section and the justification for any changes shall be based on the GC and OILs as described in Annex Q . Changes to protective measures shall be documented and approved by the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) or the LGIC ( as needed in the context of an emergency order during a provincial declaration of emergency).

Protective measures should be adjusted or rescinded when radiological surveys and/or sampling indicate that the action is no longer required in a specific location, or if the burden on an individual for continued implementation realistically exceeds their capacity to comply (e.g. individuals may be limited in how long they can remain sheltered-in-place).

8.7 Emergency Public Communications

8.7.1.1 General

The emergency public information function during an emergency shall be carried out in accordance with the PEIP.

The PEIP describes the means by which prompt and co-ordinated information from the Ontario government is disseminated to the public, media, Members of the Provincial Parliament, other levels of government, Ontario ministries, emergency response organizations, and when appropriate, private sector organizations.

The PEIP shall be activated by the PCEIO to support a Partial or a Full Activation response. The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) may consider releasing emergency public information upon adoption of an Enhanced Monitoring response, in which case the PCEIO shall be so directed.

The PCEIO may dispatch provincial emergency information liaison officers to the local Emergency Information Centre as soon as the need for assistance arises or, when a Partial or Full Activation response is implemented. This will ensure that the information being issued locally remains consistent and co-ordinated with that being released by other jurisdictions.

Multiple jurisdictions (federal, provincial, municipal, and non-government interests such as licensees) are involved in the response and, as such, every effort shall be made to ensure that the information being developed is consistent in content and issued in a co-ordinated manner. In this regard, consideration shall be given to establishing a Joint Information Centre, co-ordinated by the PCEIO, whenever the province adopts a Partial or Full Activation response.

8.7.2 Communication requirements during a nuclear emergency

The aim of emergency public communications is to directly communicate to the affected public, direction and guidance regarding protective measures they should take in order to ensure their safety and welfare.

Public direction shall be provided through the co-ordinated release of EBs (Section 8.7.2.2) issued from the PEOC, and broadcast through the media and all other mechanisms normally available to provincial authorities.

Every effort shall be made to:

1. Consult with relevant partners as to the bulletin content if time and circumstance permit
2. Issue EBs in a timely manner to ensure that the affected public has the most up-to-date information as to the actions they may need to take.

Depending on the nature and progress of the emergency, some EBs may need to be prepared or revised during the emergency. Modifying an EB will be conducted by the Emergency Bulletin Officer (a position within the PEOC Command Staff), reviewed by the PCEIO, and approved for release by the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander).

8.7.2.1 Public Alerting

Public alerting informs the affected population, by means of an appropriate signal, that a nuclear emergency is occurring or is about to occur. For any nuclear emergency where protective measures are required, the PEOC shall use the National Public Alert System (Alert Ready). Alert Ready delivers critical information to Canadians through television, radio, and Long-Term Evolution (LTE)-connected and compatible wireless devices. In a nuclear emergency, municipal and provincial public alerting shall be initiated on the direction of the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) as follows:

1. Whenever notification of a General Emergency has been received from the reactor facility
2. Whenever a notification of an Onsite Emergency (emission ongoing or imminent) is received from the reactor facility
3. As a possible action for notification of an Onsite Emergency (no emission occurring)
4. In all other circumstances as required by the situation.

Public alerting systems, in place at both municipal and provincial levels, shall:

1. Have the capability to complete the alert within 15 minutes of initiation of the system
2. Have the capability to initiate a public alert within 30 minutes of receiving notification of the applicable notification category from the nuclear facility. The time of initiation is defined as the moment the first message is sent out from the alerting system. For the sirens and Alert Ready, this goes to everyone at once. For other systems such as a landline auto-dialer, it would be when the first call is made
3. Alert practically 100 % of the population in the affected area(s). The term “practically 100%” means that the public alert can be heard or received by everyone in the alerting area unless exceptional circumstances provide an impediment.

Some alerting systems have the capability to include audio or text information (e.g., Alert Ready system), while others cannot (sirens). As such, those that can, shall provide information on the protective measures required to be undertaken and the population so affected.

The site-specific implementing plans shall include details on site-specific public alerting requirements or specifications, as appropriate.

Where possible, to ensure that the population receives coordinated and accurate information on what protective measures to take once they have been alerted of an emergency, the timing of the public alerting signals and public direction EBs shall be coordinated with emergency public information being issued. Due to the urgent nature of public alerting and public direction EBs, they may need to be issued prior to more detailed public information being issued.

Authorities having jurisdiction for public alerting shall ensure that an evaluation of any new public alerting system is completed to verify that the requirements under this PNERP have been met. Further, regular integrated testing of existing public alerting systems shall be undertaken.

8.7.2.2 Emergency Bulletins

EBs are one component of the province’s public alerting process and are a decisive form of communications that gets widespread public attention. EBs are required when an emergency results in immediate danger to the impacted area (e.g., an imminent tornado).

EBs contain pre-scripted and pre-approved content used to notify the public of specific situations occurring at an NGS. There are three types of information contained within an EB:

1. Section 1 contains information for public release (e.g., on websites, in print, through social media, etc.) as well as (if practical) a graphic image detailing the emergency planning zones surrounding the NGS site
2. Section 2 contains information that broadcasters must share with the public (e.g., content that interrupts the current signal and is played over the audio on a radio program, or as a ticker on a TV/Cable broadcast)
3. Section 3 contains concise information that can be posted to the National Alert Aggregation and Dissemination System (NAADS), one component of which is Alert Ready. The use of Alert Ready provides the public with information they need to act on immediately to avoid putting their health at risk.

Pre-scripted EBs are drafted by the Nuclear, Radiological and Scientific Response Program Branch (NRSRP) of EMO, in consultation with MEPR Communications Branch and other relevant contributing partners. Pre-scripted EBs are pre-approved by the CEM for immediate release in an emergency. Additionally, EBs that reference KI tablets will also be approved by Ontario’s CMOH. EBs that are developed in situ during an emergency are drafted by the Emergency Bulletin Officer residing in the PEOC Command Section, in consultation with the PCEIO, the PEOC Scientific Section and the PIMS and are approved for release by the CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander). EBs are not included in this document due to the level of control maintained over their authorization and use.

EBs are released in accordance with the PEOC’s Emergency Bulletin Procedure.

8.7.2.3 Media Communications

Media communications during a nuclear emergency are guided by the PEIP. In addition to EBs, ongoing communications with the media will be required to meet the information demands from the public, and to maintain public confidence in the province’s efforts to respond to the nuclear emergency. Press releases and social media post will play a significant role in meeting the demands of the public.

8.7.3 National Public Alert System (Alert Ready)

Alert Ready is an automated web-based notification system that allows the user to broadcast a text message to cellphones within specific geo-locations (i.e., a municipality). Alert Ready is part of the NAADS. The use of Alert Ready provides the public with information they need to act on immediately to avoid putting their health at risk (e.g., a tornado warning).

EMO maintains a 24/7 capability in the PEOC to operate the Alert Ready system. This is done through the PEOC Duty Officer, who is physically present at the PEOC at all times. EMO/PEOC is the authority in Ontario for issuing alerts through Alert Ready for nuclear and radiological emergencies.

8.8 Protection of Emergency Workers

8.8.1 General

An emergency worker is any person performing emergency services in support of emergency response. These workers may be federally or provincially regulated, and as such, the relevant workplace health and safety legislation applies to them. This includes people on the periphery of the response, like personnel staffing the EWC.

The Scientific Section shall periodically (as defined in Scientific Section Procedures) recommend to the CEM, through the PEOC Commander, the safety status colour code for all sectors in which emergency workers may be required to operate. This information shall then be communicated to the ERO by the PEOC Commander, per PEOC procedure.

For those working in the field after a release, sector safety status (Annex R ) shall be determined as follows:

1. Initially based on notification category, as described in the relevant Implementing Plan
2. If the release is imminent or ongoing, the assignment of safety status should be done immediately
3. If the release is delayed, the assignment of safety status should be done approximately two hours prior to the release
4. After a release, periodically by the PEOC as described in the relevant implementing plan.

8.8.2 Reactor Facility Responsibility

Reactor facilities shall support EWCs as described in 8.8.3, Annex R, and according to applicable provisions in their emergency plans and procedures.

8.8.3 Emergency Worker Centres

In the event of a nuclear emergency, reactor facilities (except Fermi 2) shall provide the equipment and trained staff to perform monitoring and decontamination activities (pursuant to federal licensing requirements to provide offsite assistance). In Ontario, these activities are provided through EWCs. During a nuclear emergency, EWCs shall be established as an operations centre, with the capability to monitor and decontaminate emergency workers and to maintain their radiation records.

At an EWC, emergency workers shall be provided, as necessary, with:

1. Personal dosimeters and other radiation monitoring devices as appropriate
2. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
3. Information and training on safe working precautions. 

During a nuclear emergency there may be a need for emergency workers to enter affected areas prior to the establishment of EWCs (e.g., police coordinating an evacuation). Whenever possible, dosimeters should be issued, respiratory protection should be worn and workers going off shift should be checked for contamination. If contamination is found, self decontamination should be conducted until the contamination is removed.

In the event of a nuclear emergency at Fermi 2 in Michigan, EMO shall co-ordinate with relevant partners to establish arrangements for emergency worker monitoring and decontamination for the Town of Amherstburg.

8.8.4 Permissible Dose

The GC for emergency workers (Annex R ) sets the overall permissible dose at 50 mSv for the duration of the response. Additionally, Annex R contains:

1. guidance for ensuring emergency worker safety
2. precautions associated with each sector safety status
3. permissible dose for non-licensee emergency workers.

Qualified radiation protection personnel shall be available to provide advice and guidance to employers, supervisors and workers registered at the EWC on how to keep their doses ALARA. This should include, at a minimum, advice on PPE, dosimetry, administrative controls, and any job-specific guidance (i.e., stay time, back-out dose rate, etc.). In addition, accumulated worker doses shall be tracked to ensure that no individual exceeds their permissible dose.

8.8.5 OHSA Responsibilities

The Minister of Labour, Immigration, Training and Skills Development (MLITSD) has the responsibility for administering the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA). Inspectors are appointed under the Act to enforce the Act, including employer obligations for worker safety during nuclear emergencies.

EROs, whose responsibilities are set out in the OHSA:

1. Should ensure the provision of equipment and training to their personnel, as appropriate, to prevent contamination and enable them to respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies prior to the establishment of EWCs. Equipment should include personal dosimeters, other radiation monitoring devices, and PPE, as required
2. May access the necessary equipment and training through mutual aid agreements or through the reactor facility, as necessary.

In the event of a conflict between the EMCPA or an order made under subsection 7.0.2 (4) of the EMCPA, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act or a regulation made under it, the Occupational Health and Safety Act or the regulation made under it  prevails (EMCPA, s.7.2 (8)).

During a nuclear emergency:

1. Designated municipalities shall include provisions in their municipal plans for the establishment of EWCs. Locations for these centres should ideally be able to accommodate the co-location of an ERAMG Field Command Post for field monitoring purposes
2. Reactor facilities shall support EWCs as described in Annex G , and according to applicable provisions in their emergency plans and procedures.

8.8.6 Consultants/Contractors

Any private industry organizations engaged to assist with response efforts will fall under the relevant jurisdiction’s health and safety legislative and regulatory requirements for personal protection of their workers. In most cases, this will be the provincial Occupational Health and Safety Act, however federally regulated workplaces will be subject to the Canada Labour Code. Any company hiring consultants or field workers to assist with gathering radiological survey or sampling data shall develop a workplace safety plan, including radiological safety, as appropriate under the OHSA prior to deployment in the field. The plan will detail how worker doses will be managed, and how dose information will be provided to the MOH for tracking in the individual’s medical records.

8.9 Radiological Assessments of the Environment

The extent of radiological impacts to the environment is characterised through radiological surveys, which provide near-instantaneous results, and radiological sampling , which requires laboratory analysis of samples. Protective actions may initially be based on pre-release plume modeling, or during rapidly deteriorating situations, automatic actions. Following release, protective actions can be revised once the radiological situation has been characterized, based on survey results and followed up with environmental radiological sampling (Section 8.6.6).

Knowing the level of radiological contamination in the environment provides:

1. An understanding of the radiological distribution in the environment including short and long-lived isotopes, which leads to effective protective actions
2. Control of the response through the ability to prioritize the mitigation of high dose rate areas
3. An understanding of the potential health risks to individuals tasked with mitigating the contamination in the environment.

Survey and sampling methodologies are further discussed in the ERAMG Plan.

8.10 Additional Protective Measures

8.10.1 General

During the response phase of a nuclear emergency, protecting the public consists of ordering specific actions to be taken at various times (Annex L ). Actions initially include urgent protective actions based on NGS categorization. Subsequent protective actions are based on GCs and OILs. As the emergency progresses, additional protective measures may be required to minimize the potential effective dose received by the public; that is, personal monitoring and decontamination.

The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall, in consultation with the MOH and affected designated municipalities, consider the need for personal monitoring and decontamination, and direct implementation of these measures as appropriate. Medical management of individuals who were contaminated, or received an effective dose during evacuation, may be necessary based on their potential exposure. 

8.10.2 Personal Monitoring and Decontamination

8.10.2.1 General

Individuals who have evacuated during or after a release should be monitored for contamination, and decontaminated (Annex L.2.6 ) as required. Evacuees shall be directed to a reception centre (Section 8.10.3 ) in host communities where they can be processed through an MDU (see Section 8.10.4). See Annex S for more information.

Reactor facilities in Ontario shall resource and operate mobile MDUs and those co-located with Reception Centres according to applicable provisions in their emergency plans and procedures.

Emergency plans of host municipalities and their nearby reactor facility shall:

1. Be co-ordinated to ensure compatibility and mutual support.
2. Ensure that a personal monitoring and decontamination system meets the requirements specified in Annex S
3. Ensure that adequate resources are in place to monitor and decontaminate the affected population, as far as practical.
4. Ensure that resources are in place to undertake monitoring and decontamination of the facility housing the MDU.

8.10.2.2 Designated Host Municipality

Designated host municipalities shall be responsible for arranging the necessary space and facilities for the accommodation of an MDU. Designated host municipalities may include provisions in their municipal plans for the establishment of Reception Centres and Evacuation Centres which have MDUs co-located.

Where MDUs are located within Reception Centres, municipal emergency plans for nuclear emergencies shall include provisions to ensure:

1. That the Reception Centre procedures and the MDU procedures are co-ordinated to ensure effective and expeditious processing of evacuees
2. The municipal appointment of a Manager of the Reception Centre who shall, during an emergency, have overall responsibility for the efficient functioning of the Reception Centre.

8.10.3 Reception Centres

A Reception Centre is generally the first destination for evacuees. Evacuee monitoring and decontamination may be accomplished either in a Reception Centre that receives evacuees immediately upon leaving the emergency area or in a facility set up separately from the Reception Centre. Reception Centres are organized to perform many of the following functions:

1. registration and inquiry
2. allocation to Evacuation Centres
3. first aid
4. monitoring and decontamination.

In the event of a nuclear emergency, reactor facilities in Ontario shall provide the equipment and trained staff to perform monitoring and decontamination activities (pursuant to federal licensing requirements to provide offsite assistance).

For those individuals unable or unwilling to attend a reception centre, they will be advised to undertake self-decontamination (instructions to be provided).

8.10.4 Medical Management

8.10.4.1 General

First and foremost, medical management shall prioritize lifesaving above all else, regardless of the risk of cross-contamination from a contaminated individual. Medical management, as detailed in the MOH RHRP, shall ensure that monitored and decontaminated individuals (i.e., those that arrive at an MDU) are medically tracked (including those with no contamination) so that their effective dose can be determined post-emergency and appropriate steps taken to monitor potential developing health issues. See Annex S for more information.

8.10.4.2 Responsibility

The CMOH will consider the need for medical management and direct implementation of these measures as appropriate.

Medical personnel trained in the clinical management of radiation injuries shall be designated in the preparedness phase, to the extent possible, and deployed to the impacted area as needed to meet the needs of the local population.

8.10.5 Reception and Care of Evacuees

8.10.5.1 General

Reception Centres is generally the first destination for evacuees who require assistance following evacuation from their homes. After monitoring and decontamination, evacuees may require assistance with lodging and unforeseen expenses.

8.10.5.2 Responsibility

In a nuclear emergency, emergency social service needs (e.g., reception, registration and inquiry, shelter, food, clothing and personal services) for members of the public who have been evacuated from their homes, shall be assessed and provided by:

1. Host municipalities designated under this plan
2. Municipalities directed to provide support or assistance under a provincial emergency declaration (Section 8.6.3).

8.106 Protection and Care of Animals

8.10.6.1 General

Any emergency that affects humans may affect their animals whether these are raised for foodstuff production, kept as companion or service animals, or for other purposes, such as in zoos. Pursuant to EMCPA Section 7.0.2, provincial emergency orders can include evacuation of animals under a declared provincial emergency. Regardless of a declaration of provincial emergency, evacuating pets will be a priority for some members of the public and should be accounted for in planning.

8.10.6.2 Responsibility

Provisions for the protection and care of animals should be included in public awareness and education materials in advance of a nuclear emergency. Municipal emergency response plans for nuclear emergencies shall make provisions for the protection and care of all animals, including those left behind during an evacuation. See Section Annex U for more information.

8.10.7 Selection of Evacuees for Monitoring

Evacuees should not be directed to report to an MDU for monitoring and decontamination if it is estimated that the evacuees can exit the affected area before a release occurs. Evacuees may be directed to report to an MDU for monitoring and decontamination if they are unable to exit the affected area before a release occurs:

1. In the case of a filtered release, evacuees from affected sectors in the AAZ and DPZ inner ring should be directed to report to an MDU. Evacuees from affected sectors in the DPZ outer ring should be instructed how to conduct basic self-decontamination of their bodies, equipment and vehicles after evacuating.
2. In the case of an unfiltered release, evacuees from all affected sectors should be directed to report to an MDU, if available. Otherwise, evacuees should be instructed how to conduct basic self-decontamination as per a) above. Follow-up monitoring should be provided in accordance with the RHRP.

8.11 Transportation Management

8.11.1 General

The MTO develops and maintains plans to manage evacuations, and the transportation impacts in the surrounding areas during a nuclear or radiological emergency response.

A site-specific UTMP shall be developed for each of the following areas:

1. Pickering NGS
2. Darlington NGS
3. Bruce NGS
4. Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant.

A UTCC, either physically or virtually, shall be resourced to provide overall coordination of the transportation management function and implementation of the UTMPs.

Where UTCC activation is required, the MTO Duty Officer will initiate notification of UTCC member organizations through email and follow-up telephone call to confirm receipt.

The UTCC shall include representatives from MTO, OPP, designated municipalities, designated host municipalities, local police, road and transit authorities, applicable provincial ministries, Metrolinx and others as required. Table 5 lists the UTCC site location based on the incident site.

8.11.2 Special Cases

Motorists travelling through the affected area and exposed to a release may be directed (through appropriate broadcasts and social media) to report for monitoring.

Marine craft in the affected area shall be treated on the same basis as evacuees. When required, marine craft may be directed to report to an appropriate harbour or landing for monitoring and decontamination (if required).

The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) shall advise the federal GOC of any change in the provincial offsite response level with known or potential impacts to marine, air, and rail travel. Navigation Canada will release a Notice to Air Missions (AKA Notice to Airmen – NOTAM) and the Canadian Coast Guard will issue a Navigational Warning (NAVWARN) in the area surrounding the NGS as communicated to the GOC from the PEOC. Likewise, the Transport Canada, may direct any train passing through the affected area and exposed to a release to stop at an appropriate station to enable monitoring and decontamination of passengers, as required.

8.12 Response Continuity and Sustainment

The requirement for continuity and sustainment is dependent of the offsite response level. When the PEOC is at Routine or Enhanced Monitoring, operations are conducted with minimal staff. At Partial and Full Activation, the PEOC is manned 24/7, thus requiring shift rotations and a multi-fold number of trained staff to fulfill critical functions. Identifying personnel within the pool of provincial employees who could take on a role within the PEOC during a nuclear emergency should be a priority once the PEOC has any indication that Partial or Full Activation will likely happen. Although identification and training of provincial employees should be accomplished in the preparedness phase, the realities of retirement, changes in employment status, lapsed training, etc. will affect the staffing of some positions. In these instances, just-in-time training may be required to prepare individuals for their nuclear emergency response duties.

As operational lead, whenever a nuclear emergency occurs the CEM may delegate responsibilities, as required, to ensure continuity of operations and the delegate(s) shall be deemed to represent the CEM when assuming responsibilities so assigned in this plan. This would not include any emergency order-making powers that may be first delegated to the CEM in accordance with the EMCPA.

Sustainment includes ensuring the staff on-watch are fed and stay hydrated for the duration of their shift. Many individuals will not take the time to step away from a hectic emergency response situation, however, it is vital to the ongoing operations that individuals do not exhaust themselves. The Logistics Section should be tasked with sustainment planning to ensure the ongoing availability of the limited staff available for operations.

During the transition-to-recovery, the operational tempo may slow down and allow operations to be suspended (or at least minimally staffed) at night. Once the RMO is stood-up and recovery operations are transferred, the PEOC can return to normal, Routine Monitoring operations.

8.13 Transition Phase

Transitioning to recovery is the first step in transitioning from response operations to recovery operations. As the RMO stands-up (see Figure 7 ), the PEOC is transitioning away from nuclear emergency response towards other issues that may be impacting the province. Additionally, the PEOC may be reverting to Partial Activation, Enhanced Monitoring, or Routine Monitoring.

The ultimate goal of the transition is to remove the PEOC from the ongoing nuclear incident and turning over responsibility for managing the ongoing remediation to other organizations within the provincial government, who have the mandate to manage the emergency’s impact on various sectors of the province’s environment and economic base. During the Transition Phase, the partially activated RMO (along with the appropriate ministry), should focus on:

1. Establishing a recovery management plan based on the PNROP;
2. Strategies for restoration of normal socio-economic activities;
3. Monitoring contaminated areas and assessing potential doses to public and workers (through ERAMG members or contracted assistance);
4. Assessing medium- and long-term health hazards that may result in temporary relocation or permanent resettlement; and
5. Maintaining dose registries for emergency workers in cooperation with the MOH. 

This diagram is for visual reference only. See the text below this figure for the full description.

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Figure 7 : Transition Phase Organizational Structure

The diagram outlines the organizational structure for the province’s transition from emergency response to recovery. The Lieutenant Governor in Council and the Premier have the highest authority, followed by the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Management. Directly beneath them is the Deputy Minister's Steering Committee on Emergency Management, which connects to the Commissioner of Emergency Management. The Commissioner connects to the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC), which includes PEOC Command, the Provincial Chief Emergency Information Officer, and a Safety Officer. Below this group are six functional sections: Operations, Planning, Logistics, Finance and Administration, Public Information Management, and Scientific. These sections are connected to the Recovery Management Organization (RMO), which in turn links to Ministry Recovery Operations Centres and Municipal and Regional Recovery Operations Centres. Ministry Recovery Operations Centres are ministries that focus on individual recovery responsibilities, while Municipal and Regional Recovery Operations Centres oversee localized recovery projects. Solid lines represent command direction, while dotted lines indicate information flow.

8.14 Termination

The CEM or designate (e.g. PEOC Commander) may downgrade the provincial offsite response level during the Early Response Phase or when the response enters the Recovery Phase. Considerations for downgrading the provincial offsite response level include:

1. There is no chance for an additional release (as communicated from the incident NGS)
2. The radiological picture is known, and long-term protective actions have been implemented
3. Other EROs are starting Transition Phase actions
4. The public is well informed regarding the emergency and the planned remediation efforts.

Termination of the emergency can be considered once the RMO is fully stood-up and assumes responsibility for managing recovery operations. Further information on recovery operations can be found in the PNROP. Once the emergency is over, the PEOC should revert to Routine Monitoring for other potential emergencies within the province.